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It is not certain that everything is uncertain. 
- Pascal, Pensees, 1670. 
He would like to start from scratch. Where is scratch? 
- Elias Canetti 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reviews and extends several results stemming from recent 
developments in the theory of market equilibrium in the presence of 
asymmetrically-distributed information. Chapters 1 and 2 consider the 
suggestion that the choice of a firm's financial structure may impart 
"inside" information about the firm's future return stream to outsider 
investors. It is found that the formal models of such "incentive 
signaling" make a strong implicit assumption about the result of the 
information transfer process; weakening this assumption is shown to 
disrupt the ability of a wide class of incentive mechanisms to support 
equilibrium outcomes. 
In a related literature, an information-transmitting capacity has also 
been advanced as a major reason for the existence of warranties on 
consumer products. One important criticism of this view is that 
consumer product markets are often characterized by imperfect search, 
the presence of which might be expected to dilute the effectiveness of 
warranties as signals of a product's underlying quality. Chapter 3 
employs an equilibrium nonsequential search model to demonstrate that 
the information content of a warranty as a proxy for product quality is 
not disrupted by the presence of imperfect search; the conditions that 
viii 
underlie signaling equilibria in perfect markets continue to uphold 
equilibria in markets with imperfect search. However, when information 
on product quality is transmitted via warranties in such markets, 
subtle welfare effects come into play depending upon, inter alia, 
consumers' inherent willingness to pay for warranties. Some of these 
effects imply surprising conclusions. For example, it may be the case 
that competitive market outcomes are easier to support in a market 
where consumers have no ex ante information on product quality 
before they begin to search (with warranties supplying quality 
information,) than in a market where information about quality is 
perfect, but search is not. On the other hand, it is possible that all 
consumers could be made better off in a 11 search 11 world (i.e., where 
quality information is freely available,) but warranty signals persist 
in order that a 11 lemons 11 equilibrium can be avoided. 
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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER I 
INCENTIVE CONTRACTING, "CONDENSED" 
INFORMATION, AND THE AGENCY THEORY 
OF THE FIRM 
Generally speaking, accounts of the production, transmission, 
and distribution of information have occupied a somewhat precarious 
position within standard theoretical treatments of market equilibrium. 
Models of competitive equilibrium under uncertainty (such as Arrow 
[1964] and Debreu [1959]) implicitly endow economic agents with a 
nearly limitless capacity to distinguish and appraise states of 
nature. Moreover, it has been observed (see Radner [1968]) that 
weakening the strict informational assumptions of the neoclassical 
models -- for instance, by restricting the agents' access to 
contingent claims markets -- has a marked disruptive effect on the 
existence of equilibria. 
Radner's early work on markets with asymmetric information 
represents a watershed in the development of the "economics of 
information", in that subsequent research has tended to follow one of 
two sharply demarcated paths. On one hand, general equilibrium 
theorists, particularly those utilizing rational expectations models, 
2 
have attempted to isolate conditions on individual agents' utility 
functions and endowments of private information such that the 
imperfect information market equilibrium can be shown to coincide with 
the equilibrium resulting from the interaction of fully-informed 
agents (for a recent review of this literature, see Jordan and Radner 
[1982].) The medium of information exchange in a rational 
expectations model is, of course, the observed sequence of market 
prices. The second predominant direction of research on the effects 
of imperfect market information is concerned with a world in which, 
for whatever reason, the fully-revealing price equilibrium cannot be 
sustained. As might be expected, the feasible models that can be 
constructed of such a world are for the most part limited to a partial 
equilibrium structure, make stronger assumptions on the distribution 
of private information, and are more conceptual -- more descriptive of 
a specific market, such as those for labor or securities -- than their 
rational expectations counterparts. This essay deals with the 
application of a class of these models, which can be termed 
"signaling" or incentive contracting models, to the modern agency 
theory of the firm. 
In an important 1937 paper, Coase demonstrated that received 
theory provided no real explanation of how the firm was bounded --
that is, where the dividing line was drawn between resource allocation 
decision-making internal to the firm and the interaction of the firm 
with the external economy via the price mechanism. Coase suggested 
that intrafirm coordination of production was characterized by a 
3 
suppression of any price-based allocative mechanism, in favor of less 
specific, performance-based contracts administered by a special class 
of factors, the entrepreneur/managers. Thus, the boundary of the firm 
was dynamically determined by whether, at the margin, the cost of the 
authoritarian, routinized transactions overseen by managers was lower 
than the cost of arranging the corresponding transactions on the open 
market. Coase's theory has been extended and refined in a series of 
papers which together comprise the "agency" or "property rights" 
theory of the financial firm (highlights of the literature include 
Alchian and Demsetz [1972], Jensen and Meckling [1976], and Fama 
[1980].) 
The major contribution of the agency theory is its description 
of the complex set of contracts binding together management, non-
management factors of production, and investors -- and its 
identification of the firm as precisely this "nexus of contracts", 
nothing more or less. The theory provides an analysis of means to the 
resolution of the potential conflict between management and investors 
through a framework of equilibrium contractual relations, while 
seeking to demonstrate that such a relationship can persist when 
managers are not themselves large-scale owners of firms, and when 
investors are not privy to the internal decision making processes of 
managers. 
The agency approach, then, posits that firms are able to solve 
the problems attending contracting within an environment of imperfect , 
asymmetrically distributed information, further complicated by the 
4 
presence of moral hazard. Over the last decade or so. a steady 
progression of formal models has attempted to characterize the 
properties of these incentive-compatible contracts, to compare the 
theoretical results with the terms of actually-existing incentive 
contracts. and to draw normative conclusions about. among many other 
things. the socially optimal extent of "insider trading" and 
information disclosure in capital markets. A relatively recent 
development in theory. the so-called "incentive signaling" models of 
financial structure. suggest that incentive contracts contingent upon 
actions taken by the agent (the manager) may have the property of 
decentralizing "inside" information about the firm's future return 
stream. provided that the action the manager takes is routinely 
observable by the principal (the investor). These models are 
potentially important, because they offer a formal rehabilitation of 
the long held but somewhat murky thesis that. for example. dividend or 
debt/equity ratio policy choices by managers somehow communicate 
information about the firm to outside investors. 1 
This essay is about the relationship between agency and 
information transfer in financial markets. In particular. it will be 
shown in the next section that the financial incentive signaling 
models proposed to date contain a very strong implicit assumption 
about the result of the information decentralization process: namely. 
that when the equilibrium exists. managers in effect transmit an 
exhaustive report of their inside information. Section 3 lays out a 
less restrictive signaling model in which the principal. the outside 
5 
investor, does not require an exhaustive report of all the manager 
knows, but instead seeks to elicit a suitable, "condensed" version of 
the manager's private information, while preserving the incentive 
compatibility of the signaling mechanism. Section 4 extends the 
formal models of Ross [1977] and Bhattacharya [1980] into this 
structure, and demonstrates that the signaling equilibrium found in 
the original models fails to exist in the more general formulation. 
Section 5 concludes. 
1.2 AGENCY, INCENTIVES, AND "CONDENSED" INFORMATION 
When the economist addresses the relationship between firm 
managers, shareholders, and the distribution of critical market 
information, his concern has a well-defined historical source: the 
transition, centered for the most part in the nineteenth century, from 
commercial to managerial capitalism. With very few exceptions, 2 the 
dominant organization of enterprise prior to 1850 was the family-owned 
and operated, functionally-integrated partnership. 3 The officers of 
these firms operated at very low levels of specialization, sharing the 
tasks of management, entrepreneurship, risk-bearing, and ownership 
between tightly-knit members of small social groups. And even where a 
firm's activities were geographically widely dispersed, the cohesive 
nature of relationships within the firm all but eliminated the problem 
of agency. 4 As Alfred Chandler has demonstrated, however, this was to 
change dramatically in the second half of the nineteenth century with 
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the invention and commercial application of the railroad and the 
telegraph. 
The joint effect of these two innovations was to make feasible 
a vast increase in the volume of production and distribution of 
manufactured goods. In turn, the new, higher tempo of operations 
fostered the development of radically new kinds of administrative 
organizations. Initially in the rail and telegraph companies, and 
then in the manufacturing industries themselves, there evolved 
hierarchical management systems in which each lower-, middle-, and 
upper-level manager performed a particular set of specialized 
functions, and contributed to the decision-making process along a 
well-defined chain of command. 5 Standardized techniques for reporting 
and evaluating internal information were perfected. But most 
important, along with the increased scale of production came an 
increased demand for financial capital a demand which rapidly 
outstripped the immediate resources of even the largest family-owned 
firms. Industry's growing reliance on public stock sales for 
infusions of capital, and the awareness of the relative autonomy of 
the new class of managerial professionals, together marked the 
beginning of the modern debate over the welfare effects of this 
presumed "separation of ownership and control." 
Ironically, the uncompromising critical position on the 
ascendancy of the new managerial class was first set forth by Adam 
Smith. Referring to the joint stock companies of his day, Smith 
wrote: 6 
7 
[Stockholders] seldom pretend to understand anything of the 
business of the company; and when the spirit of faction happens 
not to prevail among them, give themselves no trouble about it, 
but receive contentedly such half-yearly or yearly dividend as 
the directors think proper to make to them. 
More contemporary critics such as Adolph Berle, Gardiner Means, and 
Carl Kaysen have refined the idea expressed in this passage, 
emphasizing the potential link between dispersed, "outsider" ownership 
of the firm and an enhanced latitude for managers to act arbitrarily 
in their own interests, to the detriment of shareholders. 7 Those who 
viewed the shareholder as the exploited party in the ostensibly 
democratic process of corporate control had an important influence on 
the enactment of far-reaching securities regulation in the 1930s. 
Stripped of the legal and regulatory complexities, the crux of the 
dispute between the "orthodox" and the "contractarian" theories of the 
publicly-held firm lies in what each has to say about the ease and 
extent to which, in Smith's phrase, "the spirit of faction" may be 
aroused among the firm's owners. 
In order to show bow existing theory has inadequately come to 
grips with the relationship between managers and outside investors in 
the "nexus of contracts" perspective of the firm, it is necessary to 
examine two related questions. First, how does casting the manager-
investor conflict into a contractual model yield the conclusion, in 
direct contradiction to the orthodox view, that the separation of 
ownership and control is in fact the most efficient mode of 
organization of the firm? And second, what is the role of the 
revelation of "inside" information in supporting an equilibrium 
8 
outcome of the implied agency relationship between management and 
shareholders? 
Before a firm can begin production, it must lay claim to a 
stream of capital. Where capital requirements exceed the wealth of 
the firm's operators, it would be desirable to have access to a 
specialized market on which financing of present needs for capital 
could be exchanged for claims on the firm's future returns. But if 
this securities market is incomplete -- that is, if investors are 
unable to guarantee their preferred return stream in every state of 
the world -- and if investors remain for the most part outside the 
decision-making process of management, an obvious problem of adverse 
selection imperils the efficient functioning of the market. 8 The 
agency theory of the firm asserts that the persistence of outsider-
held, residual-claim financial instruments can only be explained by 
regarding the relationship between managers and outsider investors as 
a contractual one, and by realizing that the contracts defining the 
firm contain important provisions designed to limit the ability of 
managers to divert the firm's returns away from the shareholders. 
These provisions take a number of forms, but their overall effect is 
to reinforce the efficiency of both the securities market and the 
market for management teams. 
One important class of contractual provisions, discussed at 
length in Alchian and Demsetz [1972] and Jensen and Meckling [1976], 
is concerned with the neutralization of monitoring and coordination 
costs. When investors advance "front money" to a firm in return for a 
9 
set of residual claims on the firms' returns, they undertake the risk 
that the firm's operations may yield no residual. In order to dilute 
this risk, shareholders require a perfect property right in the shares 
they hold, so that they can freely transfer their holdings between 
firms (via the capital markets) without having to incur the costs of 
attempting to proxy the firm away from the control of the current 
management team. A similar argument is advanced for the observed 
existence of limited liability shareholdings -- since unlimited 
liability investors would derive sharply reduced benefits from 
diversification of their holdings, by virtue of the fact that the 
unforeseen demise of a single firm could pose a serious threat to an 
investor's entire wealth. 9 Besides strengthening the efficiency of 
the market for risk, these contractual provisions are the basis for 
the informational asymmetry between shareholders and managers. The 
neutralization of diversification costs translates directly to an 
increasing separation of ownership and control. Or, as Fama has 
said: 10 
Since he holds the securities of many firms precisely to avoid 
having his wealth depend too much on any one firm, an individual 
security holder generally has no special interest in personally 
overseeing the detailed activities of any firm. 
It is clear then, that the attributes of manager-shareholder 
relationships distinguished by the contractarian theory of the firm 
actively contribute to the efficiency of risk bearing; but it is 
equally clear that institutions such as limited liability or free 
access to secondary claims markets do not in themselves guarantee a 
10 
solution to the agency problem they create. Hand in hand with a 
contracts-based theory must go a satisfactory account of an agency 
relationship -- which is why the two terms are often used 
interchangeably in the literature. If a firm is to be validly 
regarded as a nexus of contracts, it must be demonstrated that the 
assignment to managers of a property right in "inside" information 
takes place not through an exercise of raw managerial power, but 
through a contractual allocation disciplined by competitive markets. 
So, the questions addressed in this section reduce to a question about 
how this market discipline can be maintained in a non-rational-
expectations world. Or more specifically, how do investors --
characterized by their preferences over risky streams of asset returns 
-- develop expectations of the market values of risky assets, given 
the manager's stewardship over the details of the firm's operations? 
The incentive contracting literature has made a valuable 
contribution towards bridging this "expectations gap". The idea of 
decentralizing private information through agency contracts contingent 
on actions and outcomes directly observable by the principal can be 
traced to the "market signaling" models of Akerlof [1970] and 
particularly, Spence [19741. 11 Over the last five years or so, 
financial signaling models have been developed which suggest that 
inside information may be systematically communicated to the market by 
dividend policy (Bhattacharya [1979], [1980]), a choice of debt 
insurance (Thaker [1982]), the manager's holdings of stock in his own 
firm (Leland and Pyle [1977]), and, of immediate concern to this 
11 
essay, the selection of debt-equity policy (Ross [1977]. [1978], 
Heinkle [1982].) In Ross's two-period, partial-equilibrium model, 
managers possess "inside" information on the distribution of firms' 
future returns, while the security market trades of "outside" 
investors impart none of this inside information to the market. In 
turn, managers are compensated according to a well-defined incentive 
schedule which is known by all investors. By announcing a financial 
structure for the firm (for example, by contracting for a particular 
level of debt financing), management creates a perception of the 
firm's expected return among investors. The incentive schedule is 
arranged so that the manager's compensation depends upon both the 
value of the firm perceived by shareholders at time 0 and the value 
actually revealed at time 1; thus, the manager is held accountable at 
time 1 for a falsely optimistic signal of the firm's value. Ross 
makes use of Spence's notion of a signaling equilibrium to derive a 
determinate financial structure for the firm, optimal from the 
standpoint of the manager in that his chosen signal maximizes his 
expected compensation, and optimal from the investor's point of view 
in that, where an equilibrium exists, no firm gives a false signal of 
its expected value that is, investors' perceptions of which firm is 
which are revealed to be valid. The model therefore provides the 
necessary link between fulfilled investor expectations (hence, a 
smoothly-functioning capital market), an equilibrium wage schedule for 
managers (giving correct signals to the market for managerial 
12 services), and optimal finance. 
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Nevertheless, all of these signaling models -- tor they are 
nearly identical in a formal sense -- make use of a crucial 
simplifying assumption that is inconsistent with the properties of 
manager-investor contracting discussed previously. It is generally 
assumed that both managers and investors know the form of the 
distribution function of next period's returns, but only managers know 
the parameters of the distribution particular to their firms. Nothing 
unusual here; this is a strong assumption, but one typically made in 
two-period agency models. However, the incentive signaling models are 
consistently based upon one-parameter families of return 
distributions . For example, the period 1 returns of Ross's and 
Bhattacharya's firms are assumed to be uniformly distributed on an 
interval [O,t], and the manager's inside information is his knowledge 
of t. Risk-neutral investors would assign a value of t/2(1 + r 0) to 
these returns, with r0 the one-period rate of interest. It can then 
be shown -- exploiting a special property ot one-dimensional 
distributions such as the uniform13 -- that tor an attractively simple 
class of incentive mechanisms, managers give financial signals that 
are a strictly increasing function of their firm's underlying value. 
Further, having collected a cross-sectional sample of signals, 
investors can invert the equilibrium signal function and intuit an 
expectation of the firm's value which will turn out to be consistent. 
But there is a problem with this elegant construct: when the 
equilibrium exists, outsider investors become intormationally 
equivalent to managers. The investors receive a signal which 
13 
decentralizes, to within a trivial linear transformation, all of the 
manager's inside information. Since the incentive mechanism 
investigated by Ross functions without deadweight welfare loss 
relative to the full-information equilibrium, there can be effectively 
no divergence of interests between managers and shareholders, no 
reason for investors to expend resources to monitor the conduct of 
managers, and no meaningful separation of ownership and control. 
Security prices may not reveal any inside information to the market, 
but there exists a nondissipative revelation mechanism, operating 
through incentive contracts, which restores informational parity 
between managers and shareholders. 
In seeking to provide a coherent story of information transfer 
through routine financial decision-making, the existing incentive 
contracting models plainly overreach themselves. The regulatory and 
legal remedies for perceived informational defects in the operation of 
securities markets are the focus of a lively debate within government 
and academia. It seems generally agreed, however, that an exhaustive 
characterization of the future return distribution of a firm is highly 
complex, and its disclosure is certainly not costless. Some of the 
firm's information, its "material" or "non-public" information in 
legal parlance, is rightly proprietary to the firm and produces 
produces economic rent. Full disclosure of such information would 
damage the firm's competitive position, imposing costs on managers and 
investors alike. 14 In any event, outsider investors do not need to 
become informational copies of the firm's chief executive officer in 
14 
order to make their utility-maximizing investment decisions -- indeed, 
this is the very reason they remain outsiders. 
The proper incorporation of incentive contracting into the 
overall "nexus of contracts" theory of the firm requires a structure 
enabling investors to form expectations of the firm's "market price of 
risk" without ever having to incur the costs of distinguishing the 
firm's state, or full description of the return distribution. The 
elicitation by the principal of summary data drawn from the manager's 
state information will be referred to in this essay as condensed 
information transmission. 15 A less restrictive -- and more realistic 
-- problem for the principal is to attempt to construct an incentive 
contract that advances the timing of this condensed revelation to the 
market, since this is all that is needed by the investors in order for 
their risk-bearing function to be efficiently carried out. In turn, 
the manager's incentive compensation will depend on investors' 
expectations of the firm's value imparted by the condensed information 
signal, and if an equilibrium exists, the manager's actions on his own 
behalf will be constrained to those consistent with the interests of 
shareholders. The onus on the incentive contracting models, 
therefore, is a demonstration of the robustness of their equilibria to 
the more refined model of information transmission. The next section 
lays the formal groundwork for an approach to this task. 
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1.3 SIGNALING WITH "CONDENSED" INFORMATION: FORMAL PRELIMINARIES 
Consider a firm which seeks to undertake a series of risky 
investment projects. From the developmental data on the projects, 
management knows that the future returns from the projects will be 
distributed according to a probability density function which can be 
uniquely specified by n parameters. The state of the firm at time 0 
is a vector <e1 ,e2 , ••• ,9n) in En. The outsider investors evaluate 
the firms according to a set of decision relevant variables, A, a 
subset of Em, m < n. For example, it may be the case that the firm 
finances its capital needs by issuing m different types of financial 
instruments (common and preferred stock, senior and subordinated 
bonds, and so on), and investors with diversified portfolios wish to 
establish the risk- adjusted market value of each security. Of 
course, the principal's utility function may contain more than just 
his~ post wealth; an investor could have direct preferences over the 
mean and variance of security returns. For the purposes of this 
essay, however, it will be assumed that investors seek consistent 
expectations of "next period's" risk-adjusted market value of 
securities. 
In order to accomplish this, the outsider investors and 
managers enter into an incentive compensation contract H, contingent 
on the manager's financial signals, a a L: c Em. Managers with 
knowledge of the firm's state at time 0 release a signal which is 
observed by investors. If investors could somehow observe 9 directly, 
they would associate a "true" value to each firm according to the 
16 
smooth function V:G ~ A. But because the signal and state spaces are 
of different dimension, the outsider investors are clearly unable to 
invert the signaling function and map the signals smoothly back onto 
G. However, under the correct conditions on M, there may exist a 
one-to-one function v0: ~ ~ A such that investors can form fulfilled 
expectations of the period 1 values of firms. 
The incentive contract binding managers and shareholders is a 
function M: ~ X G ~ lR 1 which takes the state description of the 
firm and the firm's signal into the manager's incentive compensation. 
A well-defined incentive contract depends only on information 
observable by the investors -- at time 0, the signal a, and at period 
1, the signal plus a (possibly imperfectly measurable) realization of 
the random variable distributed according to e. Thus, although the 
manager knows e §X ante, M depends on e only implicitly. The manager 
with utility function u(•) solves the problem max Exlu(M(a;&))], 
ae~ 




M ( F *( 8 ) ; 8 ) ~ M ( F ( 8) ; 8 ) 
V'FE~ 
Figure 1.1 Sequence of Mappings Supporting an 
Incentive Signaling Equilibrium with Condensed 
Information 
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Formally, the condition for fulfilled investor expectations is 
clear from Figure 1.1. Under the value mapping V, the set of firms 
having a particular risk-adjusted value (i.e., a level curve of V) is 
(locally) a smooth copy of ~min 9. Similarly, if M has the correct 
• properties, the level curves of F • the managers' compensation 
maximizing signals, are m-dimensional surfaces in 9. Investors' 
expectations are fulfilled if, in a neighborhood of the firm's state 
• e, the level curves of F coincide with those of V. Obviously, if 
investors find that some signal a is mapped to many elements of A, 
that signal cannot separate firms according to value, and the 
incentive contract which produced the signal cannot support a 
separating signaling equilibrium. 
The object of this essay is to show that presently-existing 
incentive signaling models do not extend in a straightforward way when 
condensed information is to be transmitted. Before turning to the 
specific model which forms the balance of what follows. a brief word 
should be given to the relationship between this essay and the growing 
literature devoted to the study of revelation mechanisms. Green 
[1982] is a recent study of the practical applicability of direct 
revelation mechanisms to institutional design problems. Employing a 
multi-dimensional state space analysis. (where states correspond to 
the private information possessed by an agent with a given utility 
function>, 16 Green has shown that the report by an agent of summary 
information -- that is. anything less than an exhaustive report of the 
entire state vector -- will not be supportable as an equilibrium 
19 
unless the agent's utility function satisfies a restrictive algebraic 
identity. 
Green's result leaves open the question of the supportability 
of revelation-like mechanisms on sets of preferences which do satisfy 
this identity. and which may nevertheless be of considerable interest 
within economic theory. A conspicuous example might be the set of 
preferences that can be represented by von Heumann-Morgenstern utility 
functions. Ross's financial model is defined explicitly over a subset 
of these utility functions. and so the generalization of Ross 
undertaken here is aimed at bridging the gap between the conceptual 
models of market signaling and the highly general (and therefore 
necessarily abstract) generic existence literature. 
It would be misleading. however. for this essay to claim a 
complete characterization of the properties of condensed information 
signaling. In the interest of tractability. attention will be 
confined to the simplest world within which information condensation 
might take place: one described by a state space lying in ~ 2 • and a 
signal space (as in the existing signaling literature) of dimension 
o~. 
1.4 INCENTIVE SIGNALING IN A MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL 
This section makes a more concrete examination of the effects 
of condensed information signaling by extending the model of Ross 
[1977] into a state space having two dimensions. The two-dimensional 
20 
framework for analysis, besides being the simplest multidimensional 
formulation of the problem, also carries with it -- via the capital 
asset pricing model -- an obvious prescription for the valuation of 
firms' returns. Several introductory definitions will help to clarify 
these points. It should also be noted that the revised model will in 
general restrict itself to Ross's underlying structural assumptions: 
expected value maximizing managers are engaged in the selection of a 
debt/equity policy for their firms, abstracting from the problem of 
activity choice. Further, it is assumed that investors do not make 
strategic side payments, overt or clandestine, to managers in order to 
influence signal choices. 17 
The Ross model specified firms with random period 1 returns, 
X, uniformly distributed on [O,t] c :m 1 • In turn, t a [c,d] c :m1, 
generating a one-dimensional continuum of firm "types"; manager-
insiders were presumed to know the t-value particular to their firms. 
A correspondingly simple two-parameter state space for firms may be 
introduced by the following: 
Definition 1 Let X, a real valued random variable, denote a firm's 
net operating income. X is assumed to be distributed uniformly in the 
interval [t1 ,t2J. with t 1 a [O,c] c lR 
1 and 
t 2 e [c,d] c :m
1 • 0 < c <d. The state space of firms is therefore 
the set 
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and a firm of state 9 (known to managers) has associated with it a net 
operating income xe. 
At time 0, each firm plans to undertake a risky project which 
will be financed through a combination of debt and equity securities. 
If the capitalization of a firm with state 9 at time 0 is composed of 
equity shares with a total present discounted money value s 9 and debt 
obligations having discounted value Fe• then the market value of the 
firm is given by the accounting identity v9 = s9 + Fe· Assume that 
all firms can borrow at the riskless rate of interest R0 • Then the 
firm's (random) rate of return on equity is R9 = (Xe- R0F9>js9 • In 
order for the investors to have a motive to diversifY their holdings 
of equity securities, it must be supposed that they are risk averse in 
§X post wealth. As is well known, with the correct restrictions on 
utility functions one may express the investors' expected rate of 
return on equity as Ex<Re> = R0 + Ap(R9 ,RM)"var R9 , where A is the 
publicly-known CAPM market parameter, and RM is the return on the 
market portfolio. 18 Taking the expectation of both sides of the 
expression for the rate of return on equity yields, for a fixed value 
of S9, and F9 (since s 9"var R9 ="var Xe,) 
And now it can be seen that the expression for Ex<Re> actually depends 
on three parameters: the two defining 9, plus one that summarizes the 
interaction of the firm 9 with the market portfolio. The state space 
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of firms can be restricted to a subset of m2 by imposing the 
condition p(R9 ,RM) = 1, (i.e., in effect, constraining the market 
portfolio to a linear combination of the individual firm returns R9 .) 
The sense of such a restriction is that it yields the simplest model 
within which the effect of information condensation can be analyzed, 
while preserving the risk aversion of investors. As will shortly be 
seen, the two-parameter extension of Ross's incentive signaling model 
will emerge as a special case of the present formulation. Thus, the 
new structure present in the characterization of equilibria will stem 
wholly from the presence of condensed information. 
With the assumption on p(R9 ,RM), the expression immediately 
above is easily seen to yield: 
E<x9> - A1/var x9 
Ro 




t1 + t2 
= 2 (1a) 
var x
9 
t2 - t1 
= 2 3 (1b) 
Thus, the assumptions on the investors' preferences, the equilibrium 
distribution of the firms' returns, and the definition of the state 
space 9 can be combined to yield the appropriate risk-adjusted 
valuation measure for returns, in terms of the underlying state: 
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Assumption 1 The firm 9 = <t1 ,t2 ) c 9 has a risk-ad1usted value 




REMARK: In this version of CAPM, the market parameter A scales the 
investors' tolerance for trading risk and return. If A = 0, investors 
become risk-insensitive, and the value mapping reduces to the expected 
value alone. In any case, investors are interested in using the 
financial signal to form expectations about the period 1 values of 
firms. Given the fact that they are cut off from knowing the firm's 
state, however, the issue becomes whether they are capable of decoding 
the information about the firm's expected value imparted to them via 
the condensed signal. 
As indicated previously, the incentive signaling equilibrium 
is composed of two parts. First, the financial signal selected by 
management must maximize the manager's compensation under the 
investor-enforced incentive schedule. The incentive schedule is 
itself an object of equilibrium, evolving through a process of 
arbitrage elimination played out between outsider shareholders and 
management. Second, the expectation of firm value that the signal 
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creates among shareholders must be fulfilled when the actual values of 
firms are revealed at time 1. Two further definitions will complete 
the formal specification of the model. 
Assumption 2 (Ross) At time 0, managers with knowledge of their 
firm's state 9 release a financial signal, the level of debt financing 
chosen for the firm. If V 0: L -) 11 is the mapping investors make from 
signals to firm values, then the incentive schedule M: LX e -) lR 1 
applied to management by investors can be expressed as: 
M(F,X;9) = c0v0(F) + c1 { x9I[F,m](x) + (xe- L)I[O,F](x)} 
= c0V0(F) + c1 { xe - LI[O,F] (x)} (3) 
where c0, c1 , and L are positive constants, and I(x) is the indicator 
function. 
In setting the incentive schedule (3), investors assume that managers 
are endowed with a fixed set of claims on the returns of the firm, and 
that managers are prohibited from trading those claims. The constants 
c0 and c1 set the relative distribution of compensation between the 
two periods. For the present, the only restriction put on F(e) will 
be one of non-negativity. Constrained by (3), risk-neutral managers 
trade off the period 0 enhancement of their compensation obtained by 
favorably biasing F against the increasing probability of suffering 
the bankruptcy penalty L should operating revenues be insufficient to 
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service the debt obligation contracted for. 
Finally, as defined in the previous section, investors demand 
a fulfilled expectations condition: 
Definition 2 • The manager's signal of financial structure F (e) may 
be said to fulfill investor expectations at time 1 if the following 
holds: 
e a & ( 4) 
where V(e) is as defined in (2). 
Incentive schedules such as (3) can be called the class of 
linear-dichotomous schedules; as contracts, they have at least three 
important properties. First, in a fulfilled expectations equilibrium, 
• V0(F (9)) = V(9), so that the manager's period 0 compensation reflects 
the firm's actual value. Thus, even if the manager were allowed to 
trade on his own account at period 0, he could not make systematic 
"insider" profits at the expense of outsider investors. Second, the 
incentive contract is contingent on an extremely coarse ~ post 
monitor of the firm's operating income, namely, whether the 
bondholders' claims were satisfied. And third, the process being 
modelled with (3) is truly one of endogenous equilibrium contracting, 
as opposed to the exogenous signaling cost structures imposed in most 
signaling models. The equilibrium results in the setting of a 
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• • • particular L (and in general, a c0 and a c1 ), such that, for each 
firm in the state space, investor expectations are fulfilled and 
managers' wages reflect their firms' actual values. 
All of this follows, of course, provided that the signaling 
equilibrium is robust to the presence of condensed information in this 
simple model. Unfortunately, there is now the following: 
Theorem. For each 9 a e, let the valuation function V:e ~ A and 
incentive compensation function M: ~X 9 ~ m1 be as defined in 
equations (2) and (3), respectively. Then an equilibrium signaling 
• schedule F (~) jointly satisfying: 
and 
fails to exist. 
max E9 [M(F,X;9)] 
F(~)a ~ 
Proof The proof consists of two parts. First, the necessary 
condition for the manager's maximization problem will be found, 
assuming that the fulfilled expectation condition holds. Second, 
another necessary condition will be derived from the fulfilled 
expectation condition, and the two will be shown to be inconsistent 
almost everywhere in e. 
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i) Utilizing (3) and the properties of the return 
distribution (Definition 1), the manager's maximization problem 
becomes: 
max m(F(e);O) = max E
9
[M(F,X;O)J 
F<e> e~ F<e> e~ 
assuming the existence of an interior maximum, the first order 
• condition for F = F (9) is 
( S) 
and now, to obtain an explicit equation for the optimal signal as a 
function of the state, the condition for consistent investor 





Adding 6(a) and 6(b) and solving for V
0
(F ) gives: 
(6c) 
, . . 
using 6(c) to eliminate v0<F) in (S) yields an equation for F (e): 
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(7) 
• ii) Now a necessary condition on F can be derived from the 
fulfilled expectation condition. Investor expectations about period 1 
• values are fulfilled iff the identify v0cF (e)) = V(e) holds across~. 
, . 
Equation (7), together with the expression for v0<F) (equation 6(c)), 
I • • -1 
show that v0<F ) > 0 a.e., so that F (e) = v0 (V(e)). Now define the 
set ~- • {e a ~ I V(e) = V} -- that is, a level set of V -- and 
v . -
correspondingly, ~- • {e a~ IF <e> = F}. It is then apparent that 
F 
the fulfilled expectations mapping requires ~- ~ ~-· [Suppose not. 
F V 
A A -
Then there can exist a 9 a 9_ such that V(e) ~ V. But, 
F 
F•(~) e v~1 (V), so that F•(~) lies in the preimage set of V, a 
contradiction]. In order for 9_ ~ 9_ to hold, the slopes of the level 
F V 
curves must be equal, or: 
• by the definition of V(e), provided that 3F <e>jat2 ~ o. Equation (7) 
• describes the surface F (e), and so it describes all of the level 
• curves of F • But in order for (7) to be consistent with (8) (up to a . -linear transformation) along F (e) = F, it is clearly necessary for 
t 2 - t 1 = 0 to hold. But by the definition of the state space, this 
condition holds only at a point in 9. If every 9 is a regular value 
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of F•, so that the level curves of F• are smooth copies of m1 , then 
the necessary conditions (7) and (8) are inconsistent a.e. in& • 
• Therefore, the function F (0) fails to exist. 0 
An Illustrative Example 
The nature of the equilibrium failure characterized by the 
Theorem can best be visualized with a specific example. Note that 
equation (7), which characterizes the equilibrium signaling locus, is 
a relatively simple member of the class of first-order partial 
differential equations; taken alone, it has an infinite number of 
solutions. Generally, a unique solution may be selected by appending 
to (7) a properly-specified initial condition. The problem in this 
application is to find an initial condition with the correct technical 
properties that also has a reasonable interpretation within the model. 
Such a condition can be derived by noting that the state space of 
firms, &, contains the one-dimensional subset 
&0 = {(O,t2>, t 2 a [c,d]}. This particular set of firms with 
degenerate (one-dimensional) return distributions is exactly the set 
of firms treated by Ross in his proof of the existence of the 
signaling equilibrium. Suppose that the &0 class of firms is known to 
investors (i.e., at time 0 investors get a fiancial signal and a 
message that the signaling firm is a member of class &0 .) Then it is 
• easy to parallel Ross's construction of F (O,t2> in the model 
discussed above. The first order condition for the manager's optimal 
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signal under compensation schedule (3) is given by (5) with t 1 c o. 
For a firm of type (O,t2 ), the fulfilled expectations requirement 
• 1 -becomes V0<F (O,t2 >> = (~)k t 2 , which is strictly positive as long as 
0 
k- is positive-- i.e., for 0 <A<~. Now, following Ross [1977], 
Section 4, considering F as a function of t 2 alone, the ordinary 
• differential equation F'<t2> = (c0/2c1L >t2 is derived, with 
• I • • -1 L 2 L k , and k e k R0 • Thus the solution is given by: 
• • L E L/k > 0 
with ~ an undetermined constant. 
( 9) 
Ross has demonstrated that (9) defines a one-parameter class 
of equilibrium signals. • Equation (7) is to characterize the F (~) for 
firms throughout 9; as a consistency requirement, it is natural to 
demand that the solution to (7) reduce to (9) on the set e0• In fact, 
(9) can be shown to be a well-defined Cauchy initial condition (see 
John [1982]), which defines a unique solution to the P.D.E. (7) in a 
neighborhood of the locus of equilibrium-supporting firms. Thus, 
equations (7) and (9), along with the boundary condition F(c,c) = 0 
• yield a unique F (~): 
(Demonstration of this is left to the Appendix.) 
(10) 
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REMARK: The "firm" (c,c) is, of course, just a riskless bond with 
value V(c,c) = c/R0• The boundary condition for this problem is 
arbitrary19; the value adopted here sets the signal of the firm with a 
riskless return at zero. The locus of optimal signals for managers is 
depicted in Figure 1.2 • 
• That F <e> cannot be an equilibrium is abundantly clear from 
Figure 1.2. Note that a level curve of the "equilibrium" locus (10) 
has the form E[XeJ~var Xe = const. -- the level curves of F• are 
hyperbolae, while the level curves of V are straight lines. As the 
straight line A'B' is traveled along the gradient vector of V (i.e., 
along the direction of fastest increase of V in &) , the "equilibrium" 
signal is following the monotonically decreasing segment AB. But the 
outsider investors associate a decreasing signal with decreasing firm 
value. Therefore, (10) cannot support consistent expectations about V 




Figure 1.2 Signaling Equilibrium Breakdown for 




This essay has offered a critical perspective on the existing 
agency theory of finance. A central objective of the agency theory is 
the derivation of contractual conditions under which non-management 
investors will lend a fraction of their wealth to firms in return for 
residual claims, while conceding to managers a proprietary interest in 
the "inside" information of the firm. To the extent that this 
research program bears fruit, and can be bolstered by empirical 
evidence, there seems likely a radical reformation of the prevailing 
climate of securities regulation. It has been contended here, 
however, that existing incentive contracting theory inadequately 
captures the informational subordination of outside investors to 
managers, a prominent result of contractual provisions aimed at 
minimizing transactions costs. The efficient raising of financial 
capital requires investors capable of correctly pricing the risky 
residual claims of firms -- but this is all they need do. Inside 
information critical to the firm's operations -- and profits -- must 
remain the property of the corporation, inevitably under the 
stewardship of the management team. But managers, able to appraise 
the probable effect of the firm's informational property in the 
securities markets, will see an incentive to attempt to trade on the 
information, or worse, to color the market's perception of the firm's 
future profitability. 
Incentive contracting theory puts strict limits on the payoffs 
to such managerial behavior. The theory asserts that managers do not 
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conduct themselves in a vacuum, but in an environment of incentive 
contracts where management's routine financial dealings constantly 
transmit information, allowing outsider investors to intuit the 
correct value of the firm's residual. This effectively short-circuits 
the manager's ability to sell any important fraction of the 
corporation's informational property for his own gain. 
As this study has attempted to demonstrate, though, when the 
constraints on information transmission between management and 
investors are more properly taken into account, the supportability of 
incentive contracting (as it is presently understood) is thrown open 
to question. A single condensed information signal is insufficient to 
allow shareholders to form fulfilled expectations for the firm's 
market value, at least for the most often-cited class of agency 
contracts in the literature. Granted, it may simply be the case that 
the equilibrium failure investigated in this essay is a pathological 
example, a contrivance. If one particular type of incentive contract 
is not robust to the presence of condensed information, others may be, 
and these equilibrium-supporting contracts may yield testable 
propositions about agency relationships in financial markets. The 
emphasis of the investigation now turns, therefore, to the problem of 
characterizing the properties of candidate condensed information 
signaling mechanisms. 
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I 
1. See, for example, Black [1976]. 
2. As Chandler notes. there did exist the British innovation of the 
joint- or incorporated stock company, dating from the sixteenth 
century and used primarily in the promotion of trade with far-
flung colonies. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, however, 
this organizational form was almost never observed in other areas 
of commerce. Chandler [1977], p. 16. 
3. Ibid, p. 36. 
4. " • • the choice of agent bad been for centuries one of the most 
important decisions a merchant had to make. Since loyalty and 
honesty were still more important than business acumen, even the 
more specialized merchants continued to prefer to have sons or 
sons-in-law, or men of long acquaintance, as partners or agents 
handling their business in a distant city." Ibid. p. 3 8. 
S. Ibid, pp. 94-109. 
6. Smith [1937], p. 699. 
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7. See Berle and Means [1932], Berle [1965], and Kaysen [1965]. An 
important methodological critique of Berle and Means, 
anticipating later developments in the agency theory of the firm, 
is De Alessi [1973]. 
8. And this is essentially where the orthodoxy leaves the problem. 
For example, Berle regards the stockholder's role in corporate 
affairs to have simply withered away -- noesire to discover an 
'owner-entrepreneurship' or 'risk-taking' function in 
stockholders is basically • • • an emotional desire to find some 
functional justification for having stockholders at all." See 
Berle QR. £!1., p. 37. 
9. See Jensen and Meckling [1976], p. 331. The institutions of 
fully alienable rights to residuals, limited liability, and 
perpetual life of the underlying organization define the 
corporate enterprise. See Posner [1972], pp. 177-78. 
10. Fama [1980], p. 291. 
11. What is to be posed here is an agency model, if the term agency 
is used in its broadest sense. This is clearly not a model in 
the mold of Harris and Raviv [1979], in which the agent has a 
disutility of effort in taking some action. But to the extent 
that a principal structures a well-defined set of rules within 
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which agents must communicate and interact, and the outcome of 
this interaction is the division of some economic prize, an 
agency problem may be said to exist. 
12. Stiglitz (see Stiglitz [1974]) has established a theorem 
generalizing the famous "irrelevancy proposition" of Miller and 
Hodigliani [1958]. In a multi-period model, Stiglitz 
demonstrated that, given a general equilibrium solution for bond 
prices and values of firms following the announcement of a 
particular financial policy. there exists a second general 
equilibrium solution wherein some or all of the firms have 
changed financial policies, and investors have made offsetting 
portfolio adjustments which leave the values of firms unchanged. 
Three critical assumptions were made in the proof, leaving the 
implication that if any of the three were sufficiently weakened, 
a positive role for "pure" finance might be revealed. These 
basic assumptions were, first, equal-cost access to the 
frictionless capital markets by firms and individuals; second, no 
bankruptcy, reorganization, or other brokerage costs; and third, 
that investor expectations about a firm's profitability remain 
invariant to the firm's announcement of a financial policy. The 
incentive contracting approaches to a theory of optimal financial 
structure result from discarding the third of Stiglitz's 
assumptions. 
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13. The characteristic alluded to is the monotone likelihood ratio 
property, which, in the one-parameter incentive signaling models, 
helps to insure the monotonicity of the equilibrium signal in the 
firm's state parameter. See, for example, Bhattacharya [1979], 
p. 263. 
14. Scott [1980], especially Section I, is a cogent summary of the 
controversy in the field of disclosure regulation. The legal 
status of a property right in information itself --
"intellectual" property is unclear (see, for example, Cheung 
[1982].) Viewed from a legal perspective, the issue raised by 
condensed information incentive contracting is whether 
shareholders can safeguard their property right to the firm's 
residual returns while allocating the rights in "material" 
information to the corporation via management. 
15. Condensation of signalled information is not confined to the 
financial incentive signaling models. It occurs in any incentive 
contracting relationship where eliciting the state is costly. 
For example, in Spence's job market models, the employer is 
interested in a particular applicant's productivity in a given 
job, not in an exhaustive account of all the accrued knowledge, 
resources, and related task experience that in fact determine the 
applicant's productivity. The employer acquires a suitably 
cheap, manageable condensation of the applicant's state (in the 
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form of an academic or vocational education record, for example), 
and if the employment contract is structured according to the 
signaling paradigm, the applicant "assigns himself" the correct 
job -- but the employer never knows the applicant's state. 
16. Green imposes on agents a decision rule (a smooth mapping from a 
set of states S to actions); in turn, a reward function maps 
agent actions to a set of transfers, T. For a given state s, 
then, a decision rule is strictly supportable if there exists a 
reward function r such that the decision rule specifies the 
• • unique action a which maximizes agent utility u(s,r(a )) at s. 
17. Bhattacharya [1980] notes that because shareholders are not 
subject to the same cost structure as managers in Ross's model, 
there may exist adverse incentives for shareholders to attempt to 
influence the signaling process. 
18. A standard reference on the underlying assumptions of CAPM is 
Rubenstein [1973]. A more detailed examination of the 
relationship between the investor's and the manager's 
optimization problem appears in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
19. As can be seen from equation (9) and Figure 1.2, the boundary 
condition given is such that only one firm [the firm (c,c)] 
signals zero. By the implicit function theorem, the inverse 
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image of zero under the signaling map is in general a rectifiable 
curve. This, taken together with the non-negativity constraint 
on signals implies that if some other firm, (O,c) perhaps, is set 
to signal zero, then there will exist a set of positive measure 
in lR 2 of zero-signaling firms. 
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FINANCIAL INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN 
WITH "CONDENSED" INFORMATION: 
CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 
The preceding essay has shown that the reservation by 
insider-managers of information proprietary to the firm may have a 
strong disruptive effect on the existence of the incentive contracting 
equilibria which have been advanced as explanations of determinate 
financial policies for firms. A demonstration of the non-existence of 
equilibria, however, has so far only been provided for a single 
concrete and highly stylized example drawn from the existing 
literature. This essay broadens the field of investigation; the 
sustainability of incentive signaling equilibria based upon the firm's 
choice of financial structure (as in Ross [1977]) will be examined for 
a wide class of candidate incentive mechanisms or contracts. 
The models previously considered assumed (largely for formal 
convenience) that the state space of firms was a subset of E 2 • Here 
it will be assumed that the state of a firm lies within some bounded, 
measurable space of two dimensions. For example, a firm's state at 
time 0 may be represented as a particular endowment of a production 
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technology along with a marketing strategy for the product. The joint 
specification of the state parameters, along with the distribution 
function for the firm's period 1 returns, will imply some realization 
of net operating income for the firm at time 1. The state information 
remains proprietary to the firm (specifically, to management) 
presumably because an exhaustive revelation to the market of the 
firm's technology or its marketing plans would jeopardize the 
realization of the firm's returns. Instead, the efficiency of risk 
bearing and financial capital formation via the securities markets is 
to be supported by "condensed" information signals emanating from the 
routine financial decisions of management. Outsider investors and 
management enter into incentive contracts which enable outsiders to 
rely on financial structure as a signal of the firm's expected value. 
The demonstration of the non-existence of incentive 
contracting equilibria undertaken here will differ importantly from 
the strategy adopted in the previous chapter. Rather than attempting 
• to derive an "optimal" signaling schedule F and thence reasoning to 
an internal contradiction within the equilibrium contracting 
structure, a necessary condition for the stability of the incentive 
contracting equilibrium in a neighborhood of an arbitrary state e a e 
will be found, for an arbitrary incentive mechanism. It will then be 
shown that if the incentive mechanism is to be non-trivial, that is, 
if it is to support a separating signaling equilibrium, severe 
restrictions may have to be placed upon the underlying preferences of 
outsider investors for returns on risky assets, for a given 
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distribution of firms' returns. Thus, no incentive mechanism having 
the properties attributed by presently-existing signaling theories is 
likely to sustain informational equilibria in the presence of 
condensed information, for arbitrary preferences and return 
distributions. 
2. 2 A MORE GENERAL HODEL 
This section defines a formal model within which it will be 
possible to investigate the supportability of condensed information 
signaling over a wide class of two-period incentive contracts. 
Managers bound by these contracts are assumed to know their firm's 
position in some measurable, two-dimensional space of states; 
financial signals released by managers are analyzed by outsider 
investors for clues about firms' (scalar) risk-adjusted values. 
To make a start, some notation is established. Let 0 c: lR 1 be 
a bounded, non-empty set on which probability-measurable events 
-(realizations of a random variable X) will be defined. Let,, a 
bounded subset of a 2-dimensional space with elements Cf1 ,f2>, denote 
the state space. Then a set of two-parameter cumulative distribution 
functions lH :q ~ lP X can be defined, where lP X is the set of all 
probability measures for the random variable X over 0.1 Assume that 
for any particular element H(x;cp) of E, the following exist: 
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(where, of course, dH(x;T> is shorthand for h(x:T>dx ). The 
probability distributions H(•) can (locally) be written as 
distributions with parameters e = <el,e2) if the following holds in a 
neighborhood of e: 
v e a e; i,j = £1,2}. 
where 9 is the equivalent state space derived from f -- note that 
since ' is bounded, and the distributions m have finite mean and 
variance, 9 is also bounded. Denote the transformed distributions by 
~(x;O). Many of the most interesting 2-parameter distributions (such 
as the uniform and, trivially, the normal) can be transformed from 
their original parameters to a representation in terms of mean and 
standard deviation. Such a representation becomes particularly useful 
in the present model, where a notion of stability between mappings in 
the state space must be unified with an asset valuation function 
expressed in terms of mean and variance. Exactly how this comes about 
must now be discussed in some detail. 
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The Investor's Problem 
Investors are assumed to have preferences over (risky) streams 
of future wealth, described by utility functions ui(Wi) for each 
investor i. At period 0, investors choose, according to their risk 
preferences, from a portfolio of risky residual claims on the return 
streams of firms, and a set of riskless bonds. In general, all 
investors hold both risky and riskless securities -- that is, the 
securities market has a separation property. 
In contrast to the usual maintained assumption of asset 
pricing models, however, shareholders do not possess at period 0 (nor 
can they infer from market prices) a full description of the random 
variables that determine outcomes of period-1 wealth. This market 
imperfection stems from the existence of private information about the 
particulars of the firms' return streams, which, as a kind of 
"business property," remains vested in the hands of management. 
Shareholders, the risk-bearers and providers of capital, seek to infer 
the true period-1 risk-adjusted value of equities from the financial 
signals released by managers at period 0. Upon receipt of the signals 
(which take the form of the firm's choice of debt financing,) 
shareholders associate a period-1 value with the residual claims on 
the signaling firm. The actions of managers, the equilibrium values 
of firms, and the values of firms perceived by shareholders are in 
turn linked by an incentive compensation contract, the equilibrium 
properties of which are to be investigated in this essay. 
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Suppose, then, that investor i's period 0 disposable wealth is 
WOi• his money value holding of riskless bonds is Fi, and his holding 
of firm e•s risky securities has value s9i. Then his period 0 
objective is: 
where Wi = R0Fi + {;ReSei' and Rj = 1 + rj, the one-period interest 
factor for security j. The conditions under which this problem can be 





for security e are well known; 2 it must be shown that essentially the 
same structure can be applied in an imperfect markets setting with 
condensed information signaling. 
As indicated in the previous chapter, 3 the firms' mode of 
finance has the potential to act as an informative signal if changes 
in finance can alter shareholders' perceptions of the firm's market 
value. The other standard assumptions of asset pricing models -- no 
restriction on short sales, equal-cost borrowing by firms and 
individuals, and absence of bankruptcy costs -- will be maintained. 
An immediate consequence of these assumptions is that the true market 
value of the firm, V(S), is independent of the financial signal, the 
firm's debt obligation. The signal underlies the investor's 
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expectation of V (i.e., his mapping V0: l: ~A) but does not in 
itself constrain the investor's feasible set of portfolio choices. 
Suppose, for example, that a firm changed its financial structure in a 
way the market found uninformative (the firm's actual value stayed 
constant.) Then shareholders who so wished could refinance the firm 
on their own accounts to restore their preferred portfolios without 
altering the firm's value. If, on the other hand, increasing the debt 
obligation of the firm was systematically related to deadweight 
bankruptcy costs, the firm's value would in general be expressed as 
vce.F). Therefore, the frictionless market assumptions imply a class 
of non-dissipative incentive signaling contracts with "non-productive" 
signals. 4 
The other major assumption needed to reconcile the condensed 
information signaling approach with asset pricing theory concerns the 
dimension of the state space. A general expression for the market 
risk premium accorded the equity of firm e is, in the notation 
developed here: 
(1) 
where A. is the "market price of risk," a function of e and a random 
- -variable IT 9 that depends on the joint distribution of X9 and all of 
the other risky assets. Thus, expressing (1) in terms of the state 
space 9 alone requires an avowedly partial equilibrium framework. The 
incentive contract characterization theorem to be presented in this 
essay investigates the local stability of incentive signaling in the 
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neighborhood of a state 9 e e. A shareholder receives a signal F(~) 
from the firm and updates his expectation of the firm's value, holding 
the rest of the portfolio constant. If, for firms in a neighborhood 
of 9, A changes more rapidly with the firm's mean and own-variance of 
returns than with the change in the market portfolio, (1) can be 
approximated by:S 
Of course, such an approximation cannot be globally extended. Once 
again, though, the object of the present study is to examine the 
threshold conditions for the supportability of condensed information 
signaling. The larger the degree of condensation of information, 
holding the dimension of the signal space constant, the less likely 
equilibria may become. 
Provided that investors assign risk premia to the returns of 
firms in accord with (1'), the equilibrium value for the firm of state 
9 can be derived from the definition of the rate of return on equity, 6 
- - . R9 = (X~- R0F >/s9; taking the expectation, 
• where S9 has been absorbed into A. Now, defining v9 = F9 + s9 as 
before, 





The properties of A(e) -- and therefore, of V(e) -- are apparent from 
the results of capital asset theory. In the more usual notation. the 
market price of risk is expressed as: 
-where RM is the return on the market portfolio. Clearly. then, the 
effect of a change in the mean of a firm's returns, holding variance 
constant. is zero, 7 while for any security having nonzero correlation 
with the market portfolio, a~~e) ~ o. Therefore. as would be 
2 
expected, the equilibrium value of the firm (equation (2)) rises with 
increasing return mean. and changes (with varying sign) 8 as the 
variance of returns changes. 
As Rubenstein bas pointed out, the expression for A(e) bas a 
direct relation to the risk preferences of investors; hence the term 
"market price of risk." To see this, note that the general expression 
for the equilibrium expected return on an arbitrary, nonempty 
portfolio p of securities. subject to the previously-mentioned 
-the number of (identical) investors, WM is the future value of all 
,, , , _, 
securities. the "wealth" of the market, and e ii- E[u (W)]/E[u (W)], 
the Arrow-Pratt measure of individual risk aversion. Now let p ~ M, 
the entire market portfolio. Then the above becomes 
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-
A.* E(RM) - Ro = (9/I) V varWM 
VvarRM 
and the expression for A.(e) can be rewritten as 
in a way which makes clear the dependence of A.(e) on the risk 
preference of individuals, given a specification of the state space ~. 
The direction the subsequent inquiry will take will be to investigate 
whether the local necessary conditions for a nontrivial incentive 
signaling mechanism may imply restrictions on A.(e). 
The Manager's Problem on a Class of Incentive Contracts 
The wealth-maximizing manager's task is relatively simple: 
select the mode of finance for the firm that maximizes his incentive 
compensation, given the terms of his incentive contract and his 
knowledge of the firm's state. 9 The issue at hand is whether an 
incentive contract can be found that elicits an equilibrium-supporting 
condensed information signal. The terms of a prospective contract are 
constrained by the timing of information flow to the principal. At 
period 0, all that is observable by the shareholders is the financial 
signal; shareholders derive a period 0 expectation of the firm's value 
V0: ~ ~ A, and the securities market clears. At time one, the 
realization of each firm's cash flow occurs, and investors can compare 
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their perception of a firm's value with the value justified by the 
firm's earnings. If the manager's compensation package is tied to the 
market value of the firm, the manager will in general receive 
incentive pay in both periods. A broad class of two-period incentive 
contracts might then be characterized: 
Assumption 1 . Let lM denote the class of two-period incentive 
mechanisms with elements M: [ x o 4 lR 1 such that: 
where a is the firm's financial signal, c0 and c1 are constants, and 
C: L X 0 4 lR 1 is a bounded, continuously differentiable function of 
its arguments. 
Thus, a relatively Hsmooth" class of incentive mechanisms has 
been assumed. This in turn implies the presence of a reliable 
technology for monitoring realizations of i 9 at period 1. The 
nonexistence of such a technology brings a new set of problems; 10 
note, however, that the class of incentive functions lM can be 
extended -- at the cost of some formal complexity -- to a situation in 
which X can be resolved only over discrete intervals of 0. 
The incentive contracts lM are feasible for the principal, 
since they nowhere depend on e. The period-1 reward function C(a,x) 
is to be interpreted as the incentive signaling cost function. The 
incentive portion derives from the assumed property that, for e 
S6 
resulting in higher values of V(~). ac~~~x> 2 o, with the strict 
inequality for some subset of 0 of positive probability measure. In 
other words, managers who correctly report higher expected cash flows 
should receive enhanced compensation. On the other hand, it will also 
be found, in keeping with previous signaling models, that ac(a,x) < 0; a a 
for a fixed level of expected cash flow, it is increasingly expensive 
for a manager to increase his financial signal. This is because the 
signal is a fixed obligation on the firm -- a set of debt claims 
payable at period 1 -- and therefore, if the manager increases the 
firm's debt obligation unduly, he increases the probability of the 
firm's bankruptcy at period 1. Clearly, shareholders will want to 
discipline this sort of managerial behavior -- the firm is being 
"stolen" by the bondholders. These properties of C(a,x) will be seen 
to be consistent with the following: 
Assumption 2 v0 •(a) > 0. 
If v0 is many-to-one, but acjaa < 0 for some x9, the manager will 
select the minimum signal a consistent with his firm's equilibrium 
value; to do otherwise exposes him to unnecessary bankruptcy risk. 
Given that, investors are naturally led to associate increasing 
financial leverage with increasing value. 
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2.3 CHARACTERIZATION THEOREMS 
Continuing to follow most of the existing literature, it will 
be assumed that managers are risk-neutral compensation maximizers. A 
typical contract M e lM will then enter the manager's objective 
function in the form: 
where o(x;&) is the p.d.f. corresponding to •<x;&). 
Then we have: 
-Theorem 2.1 If the firm's period 1 cash flow X9 is distributed 
according to the continuously differentiable c.d.f. ~(x;&) for each 
e 8 9, then a necessary condition for the signal a = F(~) given by a 
compensation-maximizing manager constrained by (3) to be locally 
consistent with fulfilled investor expectations is: 
J (aC(a,x>)[ aA.(&) (a.<x;&>) + ~(x;&) ] 0 ax ae2 ae1 ae2 dx = o. 
for all e 8 9. 
Proof The first order condition for a manager of a firm of type e to 
maximize his incentive compensation under contract (3) is: 
(
am(a;&)) F'(~) + am(a;&) = O 
aa ae ( 4) 
Here ::is a scalar; F'(&) and :: are 1 X 2 vectors with components 
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aF(e) and am(e) respectively. In addition to satisfying (4), the 
aei aei • 
manager's signal a = F(e) must support a fulfilled expectations 
equilibrium for investors, summarized by the identity V0(a) E V(e) for 
all e s 9. Differentiating this identity yields another expression 
for F'(e) which must hold in a neighborhood of e: 
1 dV F • < e> = v0 •<a> de 
since, by Assumption 2, v0 •(a) I 0. Thus (4) becomes: 
1 dV (am(q;e>) + am<a;e> = 0 V0 •(a) de aa ae 
Now each term of (5) must be calculated. First, it is found that 
(from (2)), the components of dV/de are: 
and 
then, 
am(a,9) = v '( > J (ac(x,q>) ~< ft)d aa CO 0 a + C1 Q 8a '# Xiv X 
while: 
am(a,9) = Jc< >(ad<x;&>)dx ae c1 a,x ae 








one readily obtains: 
am(a,9) = -c s ac(a.x) (~<x;9)) dx 
aei 1 0 ax aei 
( 8) 
and so the first-order condition (5) becomes, for 91 : 
~(x;9)dx] 
= J ac(a,x) (at<x;9)) dx 
0 ax ae1 
( 9) 
and for 92: 
(10) 
Note that, if the derivatives of V(e) are cleared to the right hand 
side, the left hand sides of (9) and (10) are identical. Thus, adding 
(9) and (10), and bringing the functions of 9 inside the integral, the 
necessary condition becomes: 
J (aC(a.x>)[~ (~(x;9)) + ~(x;9) 




Necessary condition (11) has been derived, not to characterize 
• the optimal managerial signal F for a given incentive function, but 
to test for joint restrictions on the C, V and ~ functions which are 
necessary to support an equilibrium incentive structure. Evidence 
that these restrictions both in general exist and may be quite severe 
is provided by the following: 
Theorem 2.2 If necessary condition (11) is to hold on a local 
neighborhood of an arbitrary state 9 t 9, then there exists a family 
of return distributions ~(x,9) such that a necessary 
ac~i.x> # o almost everywhere is l:e:l <v3 R • 
0 
condition for 
Proof: Consider the uniform distribution with parameters (a,b), and 
cumulative distribution function: 
H(x;a.b) = 
0 x < a 
x-a 
b-a a .{ x .{ b 
1 X ) b 
Along with the familiar moments (in state space notation), 
Since H e lH. an equivalent (local) representation in terms of 9 can 
be made; the above immediately give: 
61 
and, 
a ~ x ~ b. 
A straightforward calculation now yields: 
Bf(x;e) = _9_.1......__-_x_ 
ae2 2 v'3 ei 
observe that (11) will yield a trivial incentive mechanism, with 
ac~~~x> = 0 except on sets of probability measure zero in 0, if the 
expression in large brackets within the integral is either positive or 
negative for all x 8 0, in the neighborhood of some arbitrary e a e. 
In order to derive necessary conditions for pen-trivial C(a,x), the 
conditions giving positive or negative values of the term in brackets 
are derived and jointly negated. The required conditions are to be 
derived from (by (11)): 
(12) 
(i) Suppose that in the neighborhood of some e 8 e, as~~) > 0. Then 
2 
the second term of (12) is negative. The first term is positive at 
x = a and monotonically decreases with x, becoming negative for 




then (12) is negative for all x e 0. Evaluating the supremum and 
simplifying gives: 
(ii) For a neighborhood of e a e, assume a>.ae(e) < o. 
2 




Then ( 12) is 






Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are in the form of an "impossibility 
theorem by example." Notice that the restriction given in Theorem 2.2 
is not a sufficient condition for (11) to be satisfied with acfax F o 
for the uniform distribution. The restrictions merely guarantee that 
acfax e o is not forced in order for (11) to hold. It is known that 
the equilibrium market price of risk in the partial equilbrium . - -framework assumed here is of the form A(~) =A p<Xe, RM)~2 • If the 
necessary condition for supporting the incentive signaling equilibrium 
with a nontrivial C(a,x) is to hold in a neighborhood of some state e, . - -for uniformly-distributed security returns, A p(X~, RM) must be 
restricted to a fixed, bounded interval around e, independent of e. 
If the state space ,of firms is specified, satisfying the restriction 
will in general place a constraint on the allowable range of risk 
preferences of investors (their utility functions are, of course, 
already limited to quadratic form). On the other band, if 
coefficients of risk aversion are unrestricted, one cannot guarantee 
that any nontrivial C(a,x) will support an informational equilibrium 
at every e a 9. These restrictions must be viewed as extremely 
troublesome, in view of how little they actually guarantee about the 
existence of a nontrivial function C(a,x). 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
An important part of the program of theoretical finance seeks 
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to establish the relationship between the reservation of inside or 
proprietary information by management, the efficiency of risk-bearing, 
and the nature of agency relationships between management and the 
suppliers of financial capital. It seems clear that a central 
characteristic of efficient risk bearing is the capacity of investors 
to distinguish the value of risky claims without the necessity of 
duplicating the management function. But by the same token, not all 
of the inside information possessed by the firm can be divulged to the 
market without destroying its proprietary value to the firm. 
This essay has provided additional support for the assertion 
that received incentive contracting theory may be inadequate to the 
task of accommodating these divergent properties of capital markets. 
Elaborating on the suggestive example of the previous essay, it has 
been found that even the weakest local conditions consistent with the 
supportability of condensed information signaling in general may 
require unpalatable restrictions on the state spaces of firms or the 
risk preferences of individuals. 
While this preliminary investigation seems to indicate that 
the prospects for robust incentive contracting equilibria are quite 
bleak, the notion of condensed information signaling may in fact 
provide fresh directions for the incentive contracting literature. 
Two paths of inquiry appear particularly important; both are concerned 
with the properties of markets in which inside information may coexist 
with a suitable notion of efficient asset price equilibrium. 
First, the model can be respecified so that ~ post monitoring 
6S 
of realizations of the firm's net operating income is costly. By 
paying a monitoring cost on a fixed schedule known to all market 
participants, investors select the "fineness" of the partition of the 
event space over which they can distinguish outcomes. Adoption of 
monitoring technology by outsiders would be a new object of 
equilibrium. Because outcomes of random variables would no longer be 
perfectly distinguishable, it would be necessary to examine epsilon-
equilibria in firm valuations, where presumably, a= a(c,e ). One 
object of the model would be the derivation of the equilibrium bounds 
on a(c,e ), which would scale the efficiency loss of risk-bearing in 
the presence of condensed information transmission and imperfect 
monitoring. Note that the restriction aC/axf 0 = o on the element Oi i 
of the partition of n is now consistent with the principal's 
inability to distinguish outcomes within the selected fineness of the 
partition. For an equilibrium-supporting incentive schedule, the 
investor's tradeoff cuts between draining orr too much of the equity 
value of the firm in the form of monitoring costs versus giving 
managers too much leeway to misrepresent the value of the firm. 
The second line of attack would involve attempting to restore 
incentive equilibrium by increasing the number of (condensed) 
information signals transmitted to the market. A difficulty with 
agency models of the firm based on equilibrium signaling is the 
relative paucity of testable propositions that can be derived. The 
small empirical literature on signaling (see, for example, Downes and 
Heinkle [1982],) is hard-pressed to identify patterns of dividend 
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policy or insider equity ownership that might be consistent with an 
underlying incentive contract structure. and are. in addition. 
distinguishable from patterns predicted by competing theories. A 
model based on multiple condensed-information signals may yield 
sharper and more directly testable hypotheses. The present study has 
established, informally speaking, that difficulties arise in 
supporting informational equilibria with feasible, non-trivial 
incentive functions when the agent's inside information is "richer" 
(in the sense of dimension) than the information the principal seeks 
to process. The key to restoring a fulfilled-expectations 
equilibrium, then. may lie in increasing the number of (condensed 
information) signals observed by the principal. 
The easiest way to introduce a new condensed information 
signal into the present model is to remove the restriction on 
manager's trading on their own accounts. At time zero, managers may 
choose a portfolio of securities including those of their own firms. 
provided that their trades are disclosed to the market. Investors are 
therefore able to observe jointly the firm's selection of financial 
policy and insider trades. The signal space is now two-dimensional, 
affording investors a more detailed mapping to the (two) determinants 
of underlying firm value. But since the state and signal spaces are 
equidimensional, investors may be able to invert the equilibrium 
signaling correspondence and obtain an exhaustive copy of the 
manager's state information. This is merely a revelation mechanism 
result rendered in higher-dimensional clothing. 
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The most demanding test of this interpretation of incentive 
contracting stems from preserving the fundamental informational 
disparity between managers and outsider investors. In a general 
model, the formal condition that is likely to be needed is the 
existence of a one-to-one mapping from the signal space onto the space 
of decision-relevant variables for the principal. That is, investors 
map condensed-information signals to values of the underlying 
variables which determine asset prices (e.g., in a k-factor arbitrage 
pricing model, a set in Ek). Such an equilibrium model, if 
successfully formulated, would have important implications for 
efficient market theory: through the incentive contract mechanism, a 
securities market could be shown to closely approximate strong-form 
efficiency in spite of the fact that firms retain proprietary 
information. 
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II 
1. That is. (O,B.Px> constitutes a probability space for some 
PX a lPx• where B is the set of a-subsets of 0. See Laha and 
Rohatgi [1979]. 
2. Rubenstein [1973] provides a compact derivation of the general 
relationship between the aggregation of individual measurable 
utility functions and the concept of the "market price of risk." 
which will play an important role in the present work. The 
mean-variance analysis carried out here is valid for arbitrary 
distributions of security returns provided that the ui(•) are 
quadratic; alternatively. any measurable. twice differentiable 
utility function uic·> may be used in conjunction with normally-
distributed security returns. 
3. See footnote 12. p. 37 infra. 
4. The terminology derives from Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976] and 
Bhattacharya [1980]. "Nondissipative" refers to the 
characteristic that the realization of informational equilibrium 
takes place with no deadweight loss relative to the equilibrium 
with full information about security returns. In the present 
model. this follows from the assumption of no deadweight 
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bankruptcy or reorganization costs--all flows in the the event of 
bankruptcy are pure transfers between bondholders, equity 
claimants and managers. "Nonproductive" means that here, in 
contrast to, for example, job market signaling models, the signal 
itself does not contribute to the value of the asset being 
signaled. This property holds because of investors' access to 
"homemade leverage," along with the absence of bankruptcy costs. 
S. Formally, the partial equilibrium assumption takes the following 
form. Consider an initial value of a firm's state e0 and a 
configuration of the remainder of the market yielding a 
realization of the market portfolio variable 11°. Then locally, 
A.( e. n) is expressed as: 
<e - eo>aA.I ae 
<eo.no> 
+ <n- no> aA.I an 
(eO • II 0) 
and A.( e. n) = A.( e) if the last term is held at zero (i.e •• it is 
assumed that n remains constant). 
-6. Note that in deriving the expression for Re, use has been made of 
the quite reasonable assumption that the manager's incentive 
compensation is much smaller than the firm's debt obligation. 
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7. A change in e1 with e2 held constant implies the transformation 
8. That the sign of aae'A is generally ambiguous in mean-variance 
2 
models was established by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1970]. 
9. In other words, the manager treats his task as one of decision-
making under uncertainty, not (as he might in general) one of 
finding his optimal Nash equilibrium strategy given the other 
managers' actions. 
10. See Townsend [1979]. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONSUMER WARRANTIES AS SIGNALS OF PRODUCT 
QUALITY WHEN SEARCH IS IMPERFECT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
A major area of concern in theoretical and empirical law and 
economics is the extent to which imperfect information about contract 
terms may affect the performance of consumer product markets. An 
important market imperfection arises when producers and consumers are 
asymmetrically informed about the market's true distribution of 
offered prices, product qualities, and purchase terms--as is the case 
when, for example, the collection and comparison of information about 
products is a costly activity for consumers. The conventional 
response to this perceived departure from the competitive ideal has 
been the direct regulation of contract terms, often coupled with 
judicial and legislative measures aimed at reducing information 
acquisition costs. 1 The developing theoretical literature critical of 
the current direction of regulation seeks to develop analytical tools 
capable of measuring the extent to which market performance, rather 
than the individual decision-making process, is adversely affected by 
the presence of imperfect information. 
Much of this new theory is devoted to the study of equilibria 
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in markets for search goods (i.e ., where the quality of the goods is 
readily distinguishable by consumers at the time of purchase), under 
the assumption that consumers can obtain (only) an imperfect sample of 
the existing price distribution in the market (Rothschild [1974], 
Salop and Stiglitz [1977], Wilde and Schwartz [1979], and Schwartz and 
Wilde [1982a], among others). Recently, ancillary contract terms such 
as warranties and security interests--which have a bearing on the 
quality dimension of the consumer's purchase decision--have been 
introduced into the equilibrium search framework (Schwartz and Wilde 
[1982b], [1983]). 
Some of the most far-reaching consumer product legislation is 
concerned with the provision of warranties. This essay deals with a 
leading theory of the function of consumer warranties, the so-called 
signaling theory (after Spence [1974], [1977]), in consumer product 
markets where search may be imperfect. The interpretation of 
warranties as potential signals of product quality stems from a 
straightforward but vital observation: as the intrinsic reliability 
of a product falls, it becomes relatively more expensive to warrant 
the product against failure. Therefore, if quality cannot be directly 
ascertained by consumers at the time of purchase, firms offering goods 
of varying quality may see an incentive to attempt to differentiate 
themselves in the eyes of consumers by attaching warranties with terms 
growing more generous with higher product reliability. Empirical 
evidence for such an informative capacity associated with warranties 
is perhaps best described as quite weak, but often positive. 2 
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An important reason advanced as an explanation for the less 
than dramatic empirical verification of the signaling theory is the 
presence of imperfect search. Derivations of warranty signaling 
equilibria typically assume either a single seller in the market 
(Grossman [1981]) or that consumers can exhaustively and costlessly 
compare contract terms (as in the various contributions of Spence). 
It would seem plausible that as the frequency of search undertaken by 
consumers falls, firms see a reduced incentive to undertake the costly 
process of distinguishing themselves via warranties. It will be shown 
here, however, that there is in general only a weak interaction 
between the information equilibrium (wherein consumers derive 
fulfilled expectation of product quality from warranty signals) and 
the determination of the equilibrium prices of goods of various 
qualities (which, as Schwartz and Wilde have shown, is directly 
affected by the intensity of consumer search). In other words, as 
long as the underlying conditions which support consistent warranty 
signals continue to bold, a falling level of consumer search 
eventually results in the onset of noncompetitive prices for goods, 
but not in a disruption of the equilibrium pattern of warranty 
coverage. Schwartz and Wilde [1982b], on the other hand, isolated 
instances in which noncompetitive pricing coincided with a 
deterioration of warranty coverage. 
The differences in these equilibrium structures flow directly 
from the differences between the markets studied in Schwartz and Wilde 
[1982b] and this essay. Schwartz and Wilde examined a market for a 
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homogeneous search good, assuming that consumers had well-defined 
preferences for warranty coverage. In turn, firms were characterized 
by a measure of comparative advantage3 in supplying warranties, 
defined according to the level of break-even demand required by a firm 
charging the highest price the market would bear, for a given warranty 
status. If, then, a particular firm charging the limit price required 
less demand to cover its fixed costs by dispensing with warranty 
coverage, the firm was said to have a comparative advantage at selling 
without warranties. It could then be shown that if the comparative 
advantage at selling without warranties was sufficiently strong (and 
consumer search was sufficiently scarce), firms exploiting the low 
incidence or search by raising their prices would also see an 
incentive to drop their warranties, even if all consumers preferred 
warranties. 
Clearly, though, the potential for the informational role of 
consumer warranties cannot be evaluated in a market for search goods. 
Warranties can be expected to have a signaling function only in 
markets for heterogeneous experience goods--goods whose intrinsic 
reliability or quality cannot be directly assessed by consumers at the 
time of purchase. But now, in the presence of an equilibrium 
structure of expectations, that is, a consistent mapping from warranty 
signals to expected product quality, a decision by a firm to alter its 
warranty is met by a very different consumer reaction. A change in 
warranty implies a change in markets. And if the correct conditions 
on the costs of production (including the production of warranties) 
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prevail across markets, inconsistent warranty signals render firms 
into inhospitable markets, independent of the intensity of search. 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 demonstrate these results for an experience good 
market with two qualities of goods and two types of consumers. 
A second area of concern is the welfare comparison between 
search and experience goods markets. In view of the fact that 
experience goods markets may be converted into search goods markets 
through regulation designed to require the disclosure of quality 
information to consumers, it is of interest to policymakers to know if 
such a conversion is necessarily welfare-improving, net of regulatory 
costs. Section 3.5 demonstrates that, in many instances, the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for competitive equilibrium with 
imperfect search in a world of perfect quality information are ~ 
restrictive than the corresponding conditions in an experience goods 
world with a warranty-signaling equilibrium. Thus, when search is 
imperfect, competitive equilibrium may be easier to realize in markets 
where consumers are ignorant of product quality per ~. but utilize 
warranties as quality proxies. 
3.2 WARRANTY SIGNALING WITH PERFECT SEARCH 
This section extends the equilibrium search models of Schwartz 
and Wilde [1982a], [1982b] to a market for a good available at two 
quality levels, indistinguishable by consumers prior to purchase. 
Consumers form expectations of product quality by observing whether 
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the product is sold with or without a warranty. Following Schwartz 
and Wilde [1982b], a warranty is assumed to be a perfect promise made 
by the seller to replace any and all units of a good which fail in 
service. Under these conditions, with the further assumption of 
perfect, costless search, a familiar restriction on the production 
technologies of firms can be derived which enables consumers to form 
consistent expectations of product quality based upon observation of 
warranty "signals." The efficiency properties of the informational 
equilibria depend in part on consumers' relative preferences for 
warranty coverage and the underlying quality of goods. 
Otherwise homogeneous goods are produced at two quality 
levels, measured by a unidimensional failure probability ni: high 
quality goods, with per-period failure probability nH' and low quality 
goods, with failure probability nL' such that 1 > nL > nH > 0. In 
equilibrium, a total of N firms are engaged in the production of one 
type of good (N is assumed to be large). NH of the firms produce high 
quality goods (and will be denoted H-type firms); NL produce low 
quality goods ( L-type firms.) It should be noted that throughout the 
models to follow, upper case subscripts will refer to characteristics 
of firms, while lower case subscripts will pertain to the 
characteristics of consumers. The proportion of firms producing each 
type of good is ni = Ni/N, i a {L,H}. 
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All firms face a binding capacity constraint at s units. For 
production rates lower than capacity, marginal costs are constant 
within each quality class. Firms which choose not to offer warranties 
face fixed costs of production Fi -- assume for the sake of 
convenience that FL = FH = F. If the marginal costs of the two 
products are ci' then the total and average cost schedules for firms 
producing without warranties can be written: 
Ai(x) = c + l i X 0 ( X ( S 
The assumption of a capacity constraint and the presence of fixed 
costs of production make possible the existence of a competitive 
equilibrium with a determinate number of firms in each market. If 
entry and exit are free, the competitive equilibrium price is just the 
average cost for each type of firm at full capacity, 
i a {L,H} 
Now suppose a firm offers units for sale with a warranty. In 
doing so, the firm contracts to replace defective units it sells; 
thus, in arriving at a decision about the number of units to be 
offered for sale, the firm must allow for a reserve of replacement 
units. It can easily be shown that each unit sold must be backed up 
by 1/(1 - ni) reserve units, so that the firms providing warranties 
face an effective capacity constraint siW = (1 - ni)s. The 
competitive price for goods offered with warranties becomes: 
1 [ F + F] = 1 ci + s - ni 
i a {L,H} 
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The expression ciW = ci/(1 - ni) can be thought of as the effective 
cost of producing a good of type i with a warranty. It is also assumed 
that the registration and administration costs of a warranty program 
impose additional fixed costs F. Apart from its alteration of the 
firm's production schedule, the warranty program adds no new marginal 
costs. Before attempting to derive conditions on the ci and ni 
supporting a signaling equilibrium, the assumptions which define the 
buyer's side of the market must be laid out. 
Consumers 
Consumers' preferences are to be characterized by Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Each period, consumers enter 
the market and purchase one unit or none of one of the two types of 
goods. The total number of consumers in the market in A; of these, A! 
prefer low-quality goods, while ~ are high-quality-preferring. Let 
the initial incomes of the two types of consumers be Yj, j a {l,h}. A 
reservation level of utility can be assured each class of consumer if 
no units are purchased: 
j 8 {l,h} 
Now suppose that a low-quality-preferring consumer purchases a good of 
type i, for which he pays pi. Since au1<Y1 - pi, 1)/api < 0, there 
will exist well-defined reservation prices li(~) for goods purchased 
without warranty coverage, given by: 
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And for goods supplied with warranties, reservation prices liW: 
i e {L,H} 
since the warranty guarantees the presence of a functioning unit at 
the end of the period. Exactly analogous expressions can be derived 
for the reservation prices hi(-w)' hiW of consumers who prefer high 
quality. If utility is increasing in product reliability, it will 
generally be true that IL < t 8 and hL < h8 , for a given warranty 
status. The expressions for the reservation prices are well-defined 
if all consumers know the failure probabilities ni of the goods, 4 but 
it is assumed that the qualities of goods are not apparent to 
consumers in a pre-purchase inspection. 
Instead, consumers attempt to form expectations of product 
quality based upon observations of warranty coverage. The "signal 
space" in this model is the two-element set {W,-w}. When a consumer 
with preference index j, j a {{,h} encounters a good with a warranty 
and infers it to be of type i, i a {L,H}, his reservation price, 
conditional on the signal, may be written rj(iJW); if the good is 
offered without a warranty, the consumer assignes a reservation price 
rj(il-w>. In equilibrium, warranties are to be positively correlated 
with product quality, so that all high-quality products will be 
offered with warranties, and all low-quality products will appear 
without them. For high-quality-preferring individuals, then, 
consistent expectations are given by rh(LJ-w> = hL and rh<HIW> = h8 , 
81 
while for low-quality-preferring consumers, r 1(LI-w> = lL and 
r 1 CHIW> = lH are consistent. Therefore, when equilibria can be 
characterized, the signal index can be supressed from the consumers' 
reservation prices. 
The welfare properties of the signaling equilibrium derive 
from what can be established about consumer welfare in the absence of 
warranty signals. The most important initial observation to be made 
is that, if differential warranty coverage is not present across 
markets, the only equilibria that can exist, regardless of the 
incidence of consumer search, are "pooling" equilibria. That is, 
unlike the search good case, there will never exist discrete markets 
for H and L goods both offered with or without warranties. In the 
absence of reputation or brand-name effects, consumers have no means 
of distinguishing pure experience goods by quality levels if warranty 
coverage is uniform. To see what is likely to happen in a pooling 
equilibrium, consider the case in which no warranties are offered. 
Assume further that the equilibrium is competitive--goods transact at 
• prices pi(-w)· Then it is clear that the pooling equilibrium will 
involve only a single good--if quality has an incremental marginal 
cost, so that cL < cH' the only good offered will by the low-quality 
• one. Any firm offering a good at a higher price than pL(-w) (in 
particular, an H-type firm charging its competitive price) will be 
shunned by consumers who search, and will not attract enough demand 
from nonsearching consumers to cover costs. Of course, Price cannot 
be used by consumers as a proxy for quality, because offered prices 
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can costlessly be biased by firms. The resulting equilibrium is the 
imperfect search analogy to the "lemons" equilibrium (see Akerlof 
[1970]), and is grossly inefficient, since an entire class of 
consumers (in this case, the h-types), get none of the goods they 
prefer. 
Contrast this with a market outcome in which warranties are 
offered with all products. Note that it matters not to the consumer 
whether the purchased good is H- or L-type, since the warranty 
transforms either good into a homogeneous good with a zero failure 
probability. To save on notation, then, let fw • !HW = !LW' and, 
consistent with the previous definition, hH • hHW = hLw· The only 
sustainable competitive equilibrium price in this case is 
• • • P = min[pLW' pHW]. If all consumers prefer warranties, such an 
equilibrium is, somewhat paradoxically, strictly efficient. 
It can now be made clear how 1- and h-type consumers can be 
defined, and how warranty preferences can be incorporated. Consumer 
types are defined by which product (offered at competitive prices) 
maximizes the welfare of a given type. Accordingly, if nQ consumers 
prefer warranties, the !- and h-types are: 
• • • 
!L - PL(~) > IH(-w) - PH(~) > 1w - p ( la) 
• • • 
hH(-w) - PH(-w) > hL(-w) - PL(NW) > hH - p 
respectively; that is, !-types prefer L goods to H goods without 
warranties, while h-types prefer H goods to L. Relations (la) 
represent a preference ordering consistent with a lemons equilibrium 
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in an experience good world. Consider, however, the following slight 
alteration: 
• • • 
{L - PL(-W) > (H(-w) - PH(-w) > fw - p (lb) 
• • • 
hH(-W) - PH(~) > hH - p > hL(-w) - PL(-w) 
then the possibility arises of a pareto-optimal pattern of 
differential warranty coverage. Here, the opening of the HW market is 
relatively efficient: h-types get H goods (albeit at the cost of a 
warranty), and (-types are indifferent to the change. There is an 
unavoidable welfare loss relative to the (unattainable) full-
information equilibrium without warranties. The warranty-signaling 
outcomes is more likely for consumers with sharply divergent 
preferences for quality, per dollar spent, but with relatively 
homogeneous and comparatively weak preferences for "comprehensive" 
warranty protection. 5 This, in turn, is consistent with the 
generally-observed lower saliency of warranty terms for consumers in 
comparison with the basic quality attributes or goods. 6 
The remainder of this section isolates a familiar set of 
conditions under which only H-type firms offer goods with warranties, 
• • and p = pHW. It will then be shown that these conditions can be 
generalized to markets which, unlike those of existing signaling 
models, are characterized by imperfect search. 
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A Warranty Signaling Theorem 
It remains to be shown that the informational equilibrium can 
be attained. As has been demonstrated previously, without 
restrictions on the firms' technologies there may exist "pooling" 
equilibria in which, for example, all firms issue warranties -- Figure 
3.1 portrays a graphical example. In such equilibria, warranty 
signals carry no information about product quality. Theorem 1 sets 
forth the conditions under which a warranty signaling equilibrium 
forms when consumers have costless access to price information. In 
this model, a price- expectations equilibrium exists when, for some 
set of prices and warranty coverage for each good, and a ratio of 
firms to consumers in each market: i), all firms earn zero profits; 
ii), no firm can raise its profits by changing its price or altering 
its warranty coverage; and iii), consumers, associating offered 
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Figure 3.1 Warranty Signaling Equilibrium Breakdown 
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Theorem 1 Let consumer preferences be given by relations (1b). 
Under conditions of perfect, costless search, warranties serve as 
unambiguous signals of product quality (i.e., ~ = 1, 




and the equilibrium consumer/firm ratio is a = N = s[1 - -a--+--(1~_~n-h-)1 
Proof By virtue of the perfect shopping assumption, the zero profit 
equilibrium will form at the competitive prices for the two types of 
goods. Warranties are to proxy for product quality, so the 
• • equilibrium price set is {pL(-w)'pHW}. It must be shown that a firm 
producing a given product cannot switch its warranty signal, enter the 
other market, and break even (i.e., cover its fixed costs.) Suppose 
an L-type firm warrants its product and attempts to enter the H 
market. The structure of expectation then dictates that the deviant 
firm will lose all of its former customers, gaining business from h-
type consumers. Because the deviant offers a warranty, its effective 
capacity will be sLW = (1 - nL)s and sLW < sHW because of the L-type 
product's lower intrinsic reliability. Before the entry of the L-type 
firm, the consumer-firm ratio in the H market was (Ah/NH) c sHW; after 
• 
entry the number of h-type consumers becomes Ah c sHWNH + sLw· Note 
87 
that since NH >> 1, 
• The deviant fails to break even at pLW = pHW if: 
(3) 
, . 
But since (Ah/NH} = (1 + a}sHW and, by definition of pHW' 
- . 
F + F = [pHW - (cH/(1 - nH}}]sHW' (3} can be written: 
or, 
which is condition (2b}. An exactly parallel argument in the L market 
with an H-type deviant yields the analogous negative-profit constraint 
, . 
<A 1 /NL}[pL(~} - cH] < F, which requires c8 > cL' or condition (2a}. 
Finally, with signal-switching precluded by conditions (2}, 
the consumer-firm ratios in the two-markets, (Ah/NH} = sHW and 
(Al/NL} = s yield: 
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= s[l - A - A ] 
nh l 
and the expression given in the theorem follows from the definition 
0 
Conditions (2) are the familiar within the framework of 
signaling models. When consumers are fully aware of firms' offered 
prices, warranties serve as signals of product quality if: i), 
"qual! ty" costs something at the margin; and ii), the cost of 
providing a warranty is inversely related to the product's underlying 
quality or reliability. 
To summarize this initial section: an analysis of the 
informational role of consumer warranties requires a slightly 
different placement of emphasis in the relationship between warranty 
terms and underlying goods than that existing in the search good 
literature. When the reliability of a good is unknown to a consumer 
prior to the purchase decision, the consumer in effect faces either a 
homogeneous goods market or a heterogeneous one, depending upon the 
observed variation in warranty terms. Even if consumers engage in 
enough search to enforce a competitive market price, a homogeneous 
good outcome is likely to be inefficient for some class of consumers. 
To the extent that goods have experience characteristics, then, there 
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may exist a welfare-inproving pattern of (costly) warranty signals. 
Conditions (2) are the necessary and sufficient conditions tor such 
signals when consumers have full access to price/warranty information. 
The formal differences between the signaling and comparative 
advantage interpretations of consumer warranties can now be drawn into 
sharper focus. A firm in a search good world will see an opportunity 
to raise its offered price as the incidence of consumer search falls. 
Such a firm will warrant or fail to warrant its product based upon its 
comparative advantage for issuing warranties at the highest price the 
market will bear. A firm in an experience good market, however, 
cannot be quite so sanguine about its decision to alter its warranty 
coverage. As the incidence of search falls, opportunities for firms to 
raise their prices will still present themselves. But since 
consumers' expectation of product quality are now conditioned on their 
observations of warranty coverage, a decision by a firm in a 
particular market to switch warranty coverage transforms the firm into 
an inhabitant of the other market (in the eyes of consumers). In 
particular, the entrant firm will garner exactly the same expected 
demand at any price as would a "native" firm in that market. The 
perfect search signaling conditions (2) ensure that the entrant firm 
faces a cost disadvantage compared to a native firm at any entry 
price, by virtue of the parity in expected demand. 
Intuition suggests, therefore, that conditions (2) may be 
robust to the presence of imperfect search. Nevertheless, one cannot 
immediately rule out the possibility that the conditions for the 
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various price equilibria in the presence of imperfect search might 
conflict with the cost constraints which support consistent warranty 
signals. The next sections examine the interaction between price and 
information equilibria. 
3.3 EQUILIBRIA WITH IMPERFECT SEARCH: COMPETITIVE 
This section reanalyzes the competitive equilibria of the 
previous section in a market where consumer search is imperfect. 
Consumer populations of each type are to be further partitioned into 
nonshoppers, who randomly sample only one firm's price and warranty 
offer, purchasing if the price is lower than the nonshopper's 
reservation price given his expectation of quality, and shoppers, who 
compare the price and warranty terms of exactly two randomly-
encountered firms before making a purchase decision. Since search 
intensity (the number of price comparisons made before purchase) is in 
general positively related to the likelihood of competitive 
equilibria, 7 adoption of the minimum search intensity most clearly 
brings out the effects of imperfect search, and, in this model, the 
interaction between imperfect search and signaling equilibria. 
Superscripts will denote the search variable; hence, the 
H f Al. number of -pre erring nonshoppers is h' the number of H-preferring 
2 1 2 shoppers, Ab• and Ah = Ab + Ab· In a similar fashion, the total 
number of nonshoppers in the market can be written A1 c ~ + A}, and 
so on. As before, for any exogenously specified mix of consumers, 
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catagorized by quality preference and search behavior. equilibria will 
be defined by consumer-firm ratios in each market such that firms earn 
zero profits. Firms merely select a price-warranty combination. gauge 
the demand that appears given the mix of consumers. and alter the 
price-warranty offer if doing so raises their expected profits. 
A crucial aspect of market equilibrium lies in the fact that 
the markets for the two types of goods are interactive. Consumers of 
different types maximize their net welfare by purchasing goods of 
differing quality. if those goods are offered at their competitive 
prices. If firms in a particular market attempt to exploit the 
presence of nonshoppers and raise prices. shoppers who see the high 
price and a maintained competitive price for the other market's goods 
will eventually switch to the other market. For example. if the price 
of low-quality goods rises above pL (while competitive prices prevail 
• in the H market). where fL- pL = lH- pHW' l-type shoppers who see 
• • PHW will buy high quality. Similarly. define PH = PL(-w) - hL + ~· 
The presence of these switch prices8 is a constraint on the upward 
movement of prices; note that although some consumers purchase the 
"wrong" good. no violation of the signaling equilibrium bas 
necessarily occurred. All consumers have used warranty signals to 
make welfare-maximizing purchases. given the structure of prices. 
Finally. it is helpful to make an assumption about the 
relationship between reservation prices across consumer types. 
Probably the most intuitively reasonable of these is bL > fL. and 
bH > fH -- that is, a kind of "income effect" prevails in each 
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market. 9 The assumed, derived, and defined features of the two 
markets can best be summarized on a "map" such as Figure 3.2. The 
relationships between the market prices follow from the definitions of 
the previous section and conditions (2a) and (2b) of Theorem 1. 
Notice that although only two markets appear in Figure 3.2 (high and 
low quality with consistent signals), there are actually two other 
incipient markets (where low quality goods are offered with 
warranties, and high quality goods without). Conditions must be 
derived such that competitive prices prevail in the consistent signals 
market while firms are blockaded from the signal switching markets. 
Three kinds of competitive market equilibria are possible: 
• (i) a price PHW in the H-market with the L-market nonexistent; (ii) 
• • • PL(~) charged in L with H nonexistent; and (iii) pL(~) in L and pHW 
in H. Each will now be considered in turn. 
Free entry markets such as those studied here can fail to 
exist if so few consumers prefer a good of a given type that firms 
offering the good cannot break even. This does not mean, however, 
that firms producing the nondemanded goods do not exist. With 
imperfect search, there is the possibility that these firms might give 
a misleading signal, enter the existing market, and prey on 
nonshoppers. The following, however, show that this cannot happen 







Figure 3.2 Two-Market Equilibrium 
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Theorem 3.2: Under conditions of imperfect search, a competitive 
• equilibrium with H-good price PHW and no L-good market, such that 
~ = 1, nH(-w) = 0, ~W = 0, nL(-W) = 0; a= sHW will exist iff: 
and, in the L-market, 
• Proof: If the only price to be observed is PHW' the equilibrium 
consumer-firm ratio must be (A/N> ~ sHW. • The N firms charging PHW 
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will see an expected demand of (A1/N) from nonshoppers. Shoppers will 
see a particular firm with probability (2/N); an offsetting factor of 
1/2 allocates ties among consumers, since all units transact at the · 
same price. Thus, the expected demand from shoppers (both high- and . ~ low-quality preferring) at pHW will be ( N ). Zero profits at the 
equilibrium price, with all consumers seeing a warranty and inferring 
high quality, requires: 
Or, using a = (A/N) = sHW, 
rearranging, noting that a1 + a2 = 1, gives the zero-profit condition. 
Further, it cannot be possible for an H-type firm to raise its price 
• and break even. If a firm prices above pHW' it loses all of the 
shoppers; up to the price lH it retains its equal share of 
nonshoppers. At lH' 
insures negative profits and implies the second condition. Beyond lH' 
only H-preferring nonshoppers remain. Above hH, they too drop out; so 
at the highest price the market can bear, 
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now consider the L-market. If an L-offering firm, (with no warranty) . -
charges a price in the interval [pL(NW)'pL]' he will acquire the 
patronage of nonshoppers and L-preferring shoppers. With the 
prevailing equilibrium a in the H-market, the L-type firm fails to 
break even at PL if: 
the fourth condition. The last two conditions prohibit an L-type firm 
from raising its price in its "home" market . Thus, the L-market fails 
to exist. 
Notice now that the zero-profit equilibrium in the H market 
deters the entry of signal-switching entrants even with the 
nonshoppers present. To enter the H-market, an L-type firm must add a 
warranty. When it does so, it is treated by consumers as an H-type 
firm; in particular, the deviant garners the same expected demand at 
• any price as an H-type. So, at pHW, 
But, by zero profits in the H-market: 
• Thus, necessary and sufficient for ITLW(pHW) < 0 is cHW < cLW" A 
similar argument with the condition cH > cL prohibits an H-type from 
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dropping its warranty and entering the L-market; no L-type firm can 
survive there. 
D 
• Theorem 3.3: A competitive equilibrium with L-good price pL(-w) and 
no H-good market, such that ~<-w> = 1, ~W = o, ~<-w> = 0, and 
nHW = 0, with a = s will exist iff: cost conditions (2a) and (2b) 
hold while: 
and, in the H-market, 
Proof: Exactly analogous to Theorem 2. 0 
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The most interesting competitive equilibrium results when both 
markets are active; such an equilibrium structure for the case of 
search goods has been explored in Schwartz and Wilde [1982a]. The 
analysis undertaken here, with warranties serving as quality signals, 
will differ somewhat from Schwartz and Wilde's, but the final results 
will be comparable. The imperfect search equilibrium is more 
complicated than the perfect-search two-market equilibrium of Theorem 
3 .1, because shoppers can now become "stranded" in the market for the 
good they would not otherwise prefer. An initial lemma will sort out 
the properties of a two-price equilibrium under these conditions; 
then, as in the earlier theorems of this section, price increases in 
the two markets will be ruled out by additional constraints. 
Lemma 3.1: In the presence of imperfect search, a necessary condition 
• • for competitive prices in both markets, {pL(-w)'pHW} with 
~W = 0, ~<-w> > 0; ~ > 0, nH<-w> = 0, and a fulfilled expectations 
equilibrium for warranty signals, is: 
Proof: At the outset, the principal unknowns are the equilibrium 
proportions of firms offering each type of good, ~ and nL, and the 
consumer-firm ratio, a. If goods are offered at their competitive 
prices, each firm can expect an equal share of the nonshoppers, 
(3) 
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Now consider an H-type firm. Either H- or L-preferring 
shoppers have a nonzero probability of locating an H-type firm (by 
warranty inference) on both shopping trips; the !-types will thus be 
stranded. Expected demand from this source is equal to the 
probability of a given firm being encountered (2/N), times the 
proportion of H-type firms, (NH/N), times the number of shoppers 
seeing high quality twice, (A~+ ~)/2 = A2/2, where the factor 1/2 
allocates ties. The H-type firm will also gain demand from h-type 
consumers who see one H-type and one L-type firm as they shop. 
Expected demand here is (2/N)(A~)(NL/N). Total demand for the H-type 
firm is thus: 
• zero profits at pHW then imply (extracting a factor of (A/N) =a): 
1 2 2 • 
a[a + 2~~ + a ~](pHW - cHW) - F + F = 0 
• or, by definition of pHW, 
tracing the same argument for an L-type firm readily yields: 
Equations (4a) and (4b), along with the identity~+~ • 1 yield 




s - SHW B7tH 
a = = 
a;-~ a;-~ 
1 
1 - 7tH 
'1. = 2 ~ 7tH a -l 
2 2 since s > sHW if 7TH > 0, a > 0 implies a1 - ~ > 0. But the 
nonnegativity constraints on ~ and ~ are more restrictive -- ~ > 0 
gives: 
and nL > 0 gives: 
• or in combination, condition (3). When (3) holds, DH(pHW) = 0 and 
• DL(pL(-w)> = 0; given conditions (2), no signal switching entrant can 
break even. 0 
Now, to prohibit within-market price increases: 
• • Lemma 3.2: The equilibrium price set {pL<-w>'pHW} will be stable with 
respect to price increases in each market, and quality expectations 
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fulfilled, if, in the H-market: 
( 5) 
and, in the L-market: 
(6) 
while as before, conditions (2a) and (2b) hold. 
Proof: Similar to the proofs of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3 (see also 
Schwartz and Wilde [1982a]). For example, suppose an H-type firm 
• seeks to raise its price into the interval (pHW, pH]. Such a firm 
1~ 
will get its usual share of nonshoppers, but will lose the patronage 
• of any h-type shoppers who see it and an H-type firm charging pHW. 
But because the deviant's price has not risen above pH' any h-type 
shoppers who sample the deviant firm and some 1-~ firm will 
purchase from the deviant. Negative profits for such a firm are 
guaranteed by the first condition in (5); the others follow similarly. 
As before, the restrictions (2) prohibit signal-switching. 
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 jointly characterize the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for two-price competitive equilibria with 
consistent warranty signals. The remarkable property of this 
equilibrium (as well as those found in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3) is that 
the ~ conditions necessary to support a warranty signaling 
equilibrium in the perfect search case (conditions (2a) and (2b)), 
also suffice when search is imperfect. Therefore, the first question 
posed by this essay has been answered: the perfect-search signaling 
equilibrium conditions translate intact to competitive equilibria in 
imperfect search worlds. 10 
Price/Information Equilibrium Interaction 
It appears at first glance that the two-price competitive 
equilibrium conditions in a world of experience goods with warranty 
signals consist of the costless-search signaling conditions (2) 
grafted onto the price equilibrium conditions for search goods. But 
in fact, the informational and price equilibrium conditions do 
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interact. although subtly; the equilibrium shopper/nonshopper balance 
conditions differ from those prevailing in a pure search-good world. 
The two sets of constraints interact through the parameters they have 
in common: the marginal costs ci. ciW' and the product reliabilities 
~i. i a {L,H}. To see this, examine the conditions for a zero-profit 
equilibrium in the HW market. with the L(-w) market nonexistent 
(Theorem 3.2). Observe the effect on the market for L goods of 
increasing cL. As the marginal cost of the L good rises. the RHS of 
the equilibrium conditions grow larger. slackening the constraints on 
the equilibrium-supporting combinations of shoppers and nonshoppers. 
This occurs because firms who would raise prices to exploit the 
presence of nonshoppers require more expected demand to cover the same 
l~vel of fixed costs as the marginal cost of their product rises. 
ceterus paribus. But if cL rises sufficiently, the signaling 
condition cH > cL will be violated. A similar argument holds for the 
effect of raising cHW in the HW market--moving a market parameter in a 
direction which reinforces the price equilibrium eventually brings 
about a violation of the complimentary information equilibrium. and 
vice versa. 
Changing the reliability of the goods has another interactive 
effect. Again consider the HW-only market. Suppose that ~H increase 
with all other parameters fixed. Then sHW = (1 - ~H)s falls. and 
again the price equilibrium constraints relax. This time the 
slackening occurs because the firms are getting smaller (in terms of 
capacity). Thus. if a price-raising firm failed to cover fixed costs 
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at a higher capacity, it will surely fail as the firm's maximum output 
shrinks. Notice now that as the failure probability of the H good 
rises, the signaling conditions cH/(1 - nH) < cL(1 - nL) must 
eventually be broken. 
Of course, these same effects hold in the two-price 
equilibrium. For example, as "H falls, reinforcing the signaling 
equilibrium condition. the range of price-equilibrium supporting 
a~- a~ steadily shrinks, by the results of Lemma 3.1. It should not 
be surprising, of course, that the signaling equilibrium conditions 
imply new restrictions on the range of competitive equilibrium market 
outcomes; this merely indicates that the informational equilibrium 
restrictions are nontrivial. What is vital is that warranties remain 
useful as instruments of information transfer in the presence of 
imperfect search. Granting this, it is important to assess how 
efficient warranties are as quality information conduits, relative to 
a world in which consumers are endowed with perfect information about 
product quality. 
3 .4 SEARCH VS. EXPERIENCE GOODS: COMPARATIVE EQUD.IBRIA 
Having established the relative robustness of warranty 
signaling equilibria to problems of imperfect search, inquiry 
naturally turns to a comparison of competitive equilibria in search 
and experience goods settings. This section seeks to shed light on 
two related questions. First, under the assumption of heterogeneous 
warranty preferences consistent with information equilibrium (i.e., 
lOS 
h-type consumers prefer warranties, 1-types do not), are the 
conditions for a competitive two-price equilibrium more restrictive in 
an experience good world or in a search good world? Second, can 
anything be said about the comparative welfare of consumers facing 
competitive market outcomes in the two settings? 
The first questions is meant to address the issue of the most 
efficient means of imparting information about product quality to 
consumers. It is tempting to think that the optimum state for 
consumers is one of perfect ~ ante quality information. But this 
reflex intuition may not hold in markets with imperfect search. As 
the consumer's ability to distinguish product quality at the time of 
purchase grows, so does the likelihood that a given consumer pursuing 
a fixed-sample-size shopping strategy will in effect be a nonshopper 
in any particular market. In other words, to cite an established 
result of equilibrium search theory, product heterogeneity dilutes the 
effectiveness of search. 
In order to assess the effects of different levels of consumer 
information about quality on competitive equilibria, it is necessary 
to construct a "parallel" search good world to the experience good 
markets of the previous section. This is accomplished by means of the 
following assumptions: 
Assumption l· Let two goods, types L and H, be traded under 
conditions of perfect quality information. Let h-type consumers be 
• • • defined by the ordering hH - PHW > hH(-w) - PH(-w) > hL(-w) - PL(-w) 
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• • • and !-type consumers by lL<-w> - pL<-w> > !H<-w> - Pu<-w> > !HW - Puw· 
Assumption 1· Let the product reliabilities ni' capacities s and siW' 
and cost functions F, ci' and ciW be as defined previously. In 
addition, assume that conditions (2) hold. 
Now consider the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
• establish the two-price equilibrium {pL(-w)' pHW}' 
nuw > 0, nH(-w) = 0; nL(-w) > 0, nLW = 0 in the market for search 
goods. Notice first that Assumptions 1 and 2 imply the same 
equilibrium consumer/firm ratio a for the search good market as that 
established in Lemma 3.1 above. The cost functions, capacities, and 
prices of the firms in the two markets are identical with the 
corresponding quantities of the firms in the previous section. Given 
the equilibrium a, then, the analogous necessary conditions to 
relations (5) and (6) can be written, which restrain firms from 
raising prices above competitive levels in the search goods markets • 
• For example, in order for pHW to be in zero-profit equilibrium in the 
HW market, the following must hold: 
F + F ( 5,) 
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where care has been taken to fully specify reservation prices by 
product type and warranty coverage, since both are now distinguishable 
by consumers. 
As demonstrated in the previous section, the signaling 
conditions (2) along with (S), (6) Lemma 3.1 constituted necessary and 
sufficient conditions to blockade entry into the LW and H(-w) markets 
for experience goods. In particular, if (S) holds, then condition 
(2b) serves to close the LW market to profitable entry. To see if this 
result holds in a search-good market, compare each expression in (S') 
with the analogous expression in the incipient LW market. The 
"switch" price in the LW market is the ~ as pHW' since 
• • hLW = hHW = hH. But since pLW > PHW' it may happen that pHW < pLW' in 
• which case all h-type shoppers who see pLW' and an L-type firm will 
buy L. If this does not occur, then zero profits at pHW in the LW 
1 2 - -
market requires a + 2~~<-w> < (F + F) /a(pml - cLW). This, in turn, 
is more restrictive than the first condition in (S') only if: 
_ __..F___:.+__._F__ < 
a(pHW - cLW) 
F + F 
a(pHW - cHW) 
or, if cLW- cHW < 0, which contradicts (2b). This, (2b) and (S') are 
• sufficient to deter entry into the LW market at PHW if pHW > PLw· A 
similar argument holds for higher prices in the LW market (i.e., at 
!HW and hH)--asserting that the LW market zero-profit condition is 
more restrictive than its counterpart in (S') contradicts (2a), which 
was assumed to hold. 
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But now consider potential entry into the H<-w> market. Zero 
profit conditions for the L<-w> market are, analogous to (6): 
a1 + 2a~~ < F ( 6,) 
a(pL(-w) - c ) L 
at < F 
a({L("'W) - c ) L 
once again, an {-type shopper who encounters an HW firm will defect to 
the HW market if the price he is offered in the H(-w) market exceeds 
• PH(-W) = LH(-w) - LHW + pHW. And, since fH(-w) > {L(-w)' it is clear 
that PH<-w> > pL(-w)· So the zero-profit restriction at pH(-w) in the 
H("'W) market is more restrictive than the corresponding element of 
( 6,) if: 
----~F~----- < ----~F~---­
a(pH(-w) - cH) a(pL(-w) - cL) 
or, if PH(-w) - PL("'W) - cH + cL > 0. By the definition of the switch 
prices, this is equivalent to: 
(7) 
But now, by the definition of 1-type individuals from Assumption 1 and 
the fact that p~("'W) = ci + :. i a {L, H}, 
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LH(-w) - LL(-w) - cH + cL < 0, contradicting (7); again, no new 
restriction arises. The same holds true for prices up to !H<-w> in 
the H(-W) market--condition (7) is reproduced. 
At the highest price the H(-w) market will bear, hH(-w)' only 
h-type nonshoppers remain. Hence, 
( 8) 
implies that ensuring zero profit at the maximum price in the H(-w) 
market requires a new restriction. Relation ( 8) above is equivalent 
to hH(-w) - cH > hL(-w) - cL. But by Assumption 1 and the definition 
of the h-type individual, hH<-w> - hL(-w) - cH + cL > 0, which is 
consistent with (8). Therefore, the search good two-price equilibrium 
is relatively more constrained than an analogous experience good 
equilibrium. 
The reason for the additional restriction is clear: h-type 
individuals are willing to pay up to hH(-w) for an H good without a 
warranty. In a search good world, an H-type firm can drop its 
warranty, charge hH(-W)' and get demand from h-type nonshoppers who 
~ that the offered good is H. Hence, an additional restriction is 
required to prohibit such an entrant from breaking even. 
It is worth noting that the additional restrictions on 
equilibria in the search goods market are not in general entirely the 
fault of h-type nonshoppers. The above analysis implicitly carried 
along a rather strong assumption which has been made to simplify the 
exposition so far--that the capacity of the L-type firms is ~ to 
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the capacity of H-type firms, when no warranties are offered. 
Weakening this assumption adds some new structure. Let the 
nonwarranty capacities of the L- and H-type firms be sL and sH' 
respectively, with sL # sH. Then the equilibrium consumer-firm ratio 
, , 2 2 
for both markets shifts to a = (sL- sHW)/(a!- ~),with sL > sHW 
and sHW = (1 - nH)sH (this is clear from solving equations (4a) and 
(4b) with the new capacities). 
Because the experience and search goods markets have been set 
, 
up with a common a, the shift in a to a does not change the 
inequalities which determine the relative restrictiveness of the 
competitive equilibrium conditions, such as (7). But with sH # sL' 
the definition of !-type consumers becomes: 
which may be consistent with (7) in the H(-w) search good market if 
( 9) 
(F/sL) - (F/sH) < 0, or, if sL > sH. Notice that this restriction is 
consistent with the requirement that sL > sHW. Therefore, whenever 
(9) and (7) are mutually consistent, the conditions to close the H(-w) 
search good market are more restrictive than the corresponding 
experience good conditions, for all limit prices. 
The following has thus been established: 
Proposition l· In a search good world of two quality types where 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences for warranties consistent 
with those in an experience good world having a warranty signaling 
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equilibrium, the conditions for a two-price, competitive equilibrium 
in the search-good world are more restrictive than the corresponding 
experience-good conditions. 
The answer to the first question is somewhat counterintuitive. 
When problems of imperfect search are present, competitive equilibria 
may be more readily attained (i.e., more shopper/nonshopper 
combinations are consistent with competitive equilibrium) if consumers 
are utterly ignorant or product quality ~ ante, but instead rely upon 
an equilibrium structure of quality expectations supported by the 
signaling conditions (2). The reason for this is that the structure 
of expectations in effect limits the number or potential markets to 
the number of equilibrium signals, therefore cutting out the 
possibility of consumers "spilling over" into the remaining markets. 
Welfare Comparisons 
Finally, it is of interest to be able to make an assessment of 
the relative welfare of each type of consumer in search and experience 
goods worlds. In the analysis leading to Proposition 1, it was 
assumed that each type of good transacted at the same price in each 
world; it could then be established that the markets in each setting 
had the same a and the same equilibrium distribution of firms of each 
type. Thus, the expected welfare of consumers of a given type in the 
two worlds was the same. In order to have different levels of 
consumer welfare in search and experience goods markets, it must now 
be assumed that, in the absence of problems stemming from a lack of 
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information about quality, consumers have homogeneous preferences for 
warranty protection (i.e., both types of consumers either prefer or 
eschew warranties). 
Suppose, for example, that all consumers prefer warranties, 
and that preferences for warranties as a quality attribute dominate 
consumer's relative preferences for the two types of goods without 
warranties. Then in competitive equilibrium, all consumers will get 
goods with warranties, but no two-price equilibrium will exist. This 
is because the addition of a warranty transforms the two heterogeneous 
goods into a single homogeneous good, and a homogeneous good cannot 
transact simultaneously at two different prices without violation of 
the zero-profit condition. The signaling conditions imply that the 
H-type firms have a "comparative advantage" at supplying warranties, 
and so the resulting equilibrium will have only the HW market open in 
both worlds. 
Alternatively, consider the case in which warranties are not 
preferred by either class of consumer. In a world of perfect quality 
information, the competitive equilibrium would then be 
• {pL(-w)' PH(-w)l' ~(-w) > 0, ~W = 0; ~(~) > 0, ~ = 0. In the 
corresponding experience good world, however, warranties would emerge 
in the H market, allowing h-type consumers to avoid the lemons 
• • equilibrium--with the equilibrium {pL(-w)' pHW). ~(-w) > 0, 
~W = 0; nH(-w) = 0, ~ > 0. It is clear that the consumer/firm 
ratio is different for the two equilibria, and that the equilibrium 
distribution of H- and L-type firms is also different. Who gains, and 
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who loses in a transition from one world to the other? One intuitive 
answer might be that h-type consumers must lose in a transition from a 
search to an experience good setting, since they must shoulder the 
unwanted warranty, while f-type consumers should be indifferent to the 
change. Once again, however, our intuition will be seen to fail. 
The first step in making a rigorous welfare comparison is to 
ensure that the necessary condition for a zero-profit equilibrium can 
be simultaneously satisfied in the two worlds. That is, a range of 
a; - ~ must be found such that the analogy to Lemma 3.1 can be 
simultaneously established in both worlds. Once again, let Assumption 
2 hold, with the added proviso that sL > sH; to reflect the different 
preference ordering, Assumption 1 is slightly altered: 
Assumption ~. Let the preference ordering of the two consumer types 
be given by relations (1b). 
Then there immediately follows: 
Lemma l·l· A necessary and sufficient condition for the search and 
experience good equilibria to have in common an interval of a~ - ~ of 
positive measure is (sL- sH)/(sL- sHW) > sH/sL. 
Proof: Label the variables for experience and search goods markets by 
superscripts e and s, respectively. Then the same calculation carried 




SL 1 ~= 1 
SHW 
(10) = 
SL - SHW a2 - 2' 2 ~ sL - 8HW t ~ at -
n;: sL l ~= l SH ( 11) SL- sH 2 2' 2 a2 SL- sH a - Bb a -t t t 
Therefore, a necessary condition for two-price zero profit equilibria 
in the two worlds is: 
(12) 
in the experience good market, and: 
(13) 
in the search good market. Relations (12) and (13) have a common 
interval if the upper limit of one lies above the lower limit of the 





Condition (14) is not overly strong. Note that if 
nH ~ 0, sHW m9 sH, and the LHS goes to one, so that (14) becomes 
sL > sH' which is always true. Therefore, there will exist an 
interval of nH > 0 where the intervals of a~ - ~ will overlap, and 
hence, where the two equilibria will satisfy the necessary condition 
for zero profits. 
The joint necessary and sufficient conditions for the two-
price competitive equilibria in the two worlds are now just the 
obvious analogous expressions to (S') and (6'), preventing price rises 
above competitive levels. The direct comparisons between these 
conditions will in general be ambiguous, since limit prices, product 
prices, and consumer/firm ratios differ across the two sets of 
markets. It is not necessary to perform these comparisons, however, 
in order to calculate the welfare effects. 
Knowing that there exists a common range of a~ - ~ for both 
two-price equilibria, we can order the equilibrium distribution of the 
two type of firms. Assume that (14) holds, and pick some arbitrary 
value of a~ - ~ in the common interval. Then (10) and (11) imply 
e s e s that ~ < nH, and nL > nL. Now if an h-type consumer encounters an 
H-type good and purchases it in the search world, his realized surplus 
s I • isS (h H) = hH{-W) - pH{-W); if the same consumer must purchase an 
L-type good his surplus is Ss(hiL> = ~(~) - p~(~)· In the 
experience good world, Se(hJH) = ~- p~, while Se(hJL) • S8 (hJL). 
The same kinds of expressions can be defined for the {-type 
individuals, Se(!Ji), Ss(fJi), i 1 {L,H}. 
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Now consider an p-type nonshopper. The probability that this 
consumer will encounter an H-type firm on his single shopping trip in 
the search good market is simply n:; he will encounter an L-type firm 
with probability ~· The h-type nonshopper's expected welfare in the 
search good market is thus Ws(h,1) = ~Ss(hiH> + ~Ss(hiL> 
= ss<hiL> + n:rss<hiH>- Ss(hfL)]. The correspontting expression for 
the experience good market is 
We(h,1) = Se<hiL> + n:rse<hiH>- Se(hfL)]. Now, since 
Se(hfL) = Ss(hfL), and the expression in brackets is larger in the 
search world than in the experience good world by Assumption 1', it is 
found that Ws(h,1) - We(h,1) > 0, h-type nonshoppers are unambiguously 
better orr in the search world. The "surplus" and "capacity" effects 
reinforce each other. 
An h-type shopper will purchase from an L-type firm only if 
~ of his shopping trips turn up L-type goods. In the search good 
world, this occurs with probability (n~) 2 • The probability that the 
shopper encounters at least one H-type firm is thus 1- (n~) 2 • 
So, 
Adding and subtracting one from the final two terms transforms them to 
[-1 + (n~> 2 1Ss(hfL) + [1- (n~) 2 ]Ss(hfL) + Ss(hfL) - Se(hfL); 
rearranging gives: 
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since Ss(hiL) = Se<hiL>. Further, it is known that Ss(hiH> > Se<hiH>, 
(from the preference ordering,) and 1- (n~) 2 > 1- (n~) 2 • Therefore, 
Ws(h,2) - We(h,2) > 0. The following has been established: 
Proposition l· If competitive two-price equilibria exist in markets 
for search and experience goods, subject to Assumptions 1' and 2, then 
h-type consumers enjoy unambiguously higher expected welfare in the 
market for search goods. 
Analogously for l-type nonshoppers: 
so, 
unambiguously better off in the search world! The same expression 
holds for l-type shoppers, with then's replaced by n2 • 
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Proposition 1· For the markets subject to Assumptions 1' and 2, 
{-type consumers are also unambiguously better off in a search good 
market. 
Interestingly, even though the (-type consumer derives exactly 
the same consumer surplus from his preferred purchase in both worlds, 
the change in capacity, and hence the change in the likelihood of 
encountering an H-type firm, contributes an effect which raises the 
{-type consumer's expected welfare in the transition from experience 
to search goods. 
Caveats ~ the Welfare Results 
The preceding sections have explored the properties of market 
equilibria in "parallel" search and experience goods markets with 
warranties, conditional on the orderings of consumers' willingness to 
pay for goods with and without warranties. The motivation for this 
exercise has been to judge whether the "channel" by which quality 
information is presented to consumers has an impact on consumer 
welfare. In a market for search goods, the reliability of a product 
is distinguishable by inspection, presumably because a consumer is 
able to infer reliability directly from some preexisting information 
at his command -- for example, his knowledge of the mapping from brand 
names to quality reputations across firms. In an experience goods 
market, however, the equivalent kind of quality discrimination is made 
by observing warranty signals, which, as we have seen, retain their 
fidelity as signals when search is imperfect. Analysis of the various 
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types of competitive market equilibria suggests that the welfare 
question turns on the (h-type) consumer's relative tolerance for 
warranty coverage. 
But this may not be the whole story. Although warranties 
continue to serve as quality signals in a world of imperfect search, 
the transition from search to experience goods markets involves subtle 
capacity effects when h-type consumers exhibit (1b)-type preferences 
(i.e., they have a relatively low tolerance for warranties). These 
capacity effects alter the consumer/firm ratio across markets, and 
therefore may affect the character of market equilibrium observed when 
search and experience goods are transacted. 
This effect can be observed most clearly in a single-price 
equilibrium where only H-type goods are traded (a similar, though more 
complicated, argument could be constructed in a two-price equilibrium 
setting). In a world of experience goods, the observed equilibrium is 
• {pHW}, ~ = 1, a= sHW; in the corresponding search equilibrium, 
• {pH<-w>}, ~<-w> = 1, a= s. Note the direction of the capacity 
effect: as the information mode is diverted from direct inspection to 
warranty comparison, the size of firms decreases (the equilibrium 
consumer/firm ratio falls). Thus we might hope that, if a particular 
competitive equilibrium exists in a market for search goods, the 
conditions for equilibrium will be reinforced if warranties are made 
to conduct the quality information to consumers. Therefore, any mix 
of consumers consistent with a particular market equilibrium in a 
search world will find themselves in the qualitatively similar 
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equilibrium in an experience good world, and the previously-derived 
welfare comparisons will stand. Unfortunately, such a straightforward 
result cannot in general be established. 
To see this, examine the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a single-price (H-good) equilibrium in the search/equilibrium 
world setting. Begin with the search world as a basis for comparison. 
First, entry into the L(-w) market must be blockaded. If only the H 
market is open, then the consumer mix is such that no L-type entrant 
can charge a price up to p~ in the L(-w) market and break even, or, 
s -s 1 2 -s 
DL(-w) (pL = s(a + 2a1> [pL- c1J < 0. But now the following holds: 
Claim: 
Proof: By the definition of switch prices in the two markets, 
-e -s • • 
PL- PL = {H(-W) - PH(-W) - ({HW - pHW) > 0, where the inequality 
follows from the preference ordering (1b). 
Clearly, then, two effects occur in the transition to the experience 
good market: the effective capacity of the market falls, but the 
switch price rises, reflecting the fact that as warranties are added 
(when warranty tolerance is low), the H good becomes a less attractive 
substitute for the L good. Thus, the entrant has more latitude to 
raise his price before he losses demand from {-type shoppers. This 
implies that closing the L(-w) market to entry in the experience good 
world requires a new restriction. 
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Closure of the L<-w> market in the search world implies 
e -e s -s 
closure in the experience good world if IlL<-w>(pL)- IIL<-w>(pL) ~ 0 
• for a distribution of consumers associated with a {pH<-w>} single 
price equilibrium in a search market, or, 
equivalently, 
A slight rearrangement makes the interpretation of the new restriction 
clear -- multiply both sides by s, and note that nHs = s - sHW. Then 
the restriction requires that the pure incremental revenue effect of 
the switch price rise in the experience good market must be offset by 
the decline in effective capacity caused by the addition of the 
warranty. 
This is the only new restriction generated in the L(-w) market 
in the transition to an experience good setting. It is easy to see 
that at higher prices in the L(-w) market, for example, at !L where 
only non-shoppers remain, negative profits in the search world imply 
negative profits in the experience world. 
A similar, slightly more complicated situation holds in the 
(open) market for H-type goods. Again, the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for competitive H-good equilibrium in a search good market 
do not in general imply the existence of the corresponding equilibrium 
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in a market where warranties carry quality information. The two kinds 
of markets in effect transact different "versions" of the H good, and 
so limit prices, costs, and capacities change in the transition. 
To derive the new restrictions in the H market, consider the 
!-type consumer's limit price in the search world. Assume the 
search-world consumer proportion a1 is such that no firm can raise its 
offered price to !H(-w) and break even, that is, 11~(-w)<lH(-w)> < 0. 
Then the same holds in the experience good world if: 
or, 
but now, from the definition of type (lb) preferences, 
• • {HW- PHW- (fH(-w) - PH(-w) ! 0 
which can be easily rearranged to yield: 
a comparison of the profit condition and the above implication of the 
preference ordering indicates that zero profits at the limit price for 
{-type consumers in the experience good world requires: 
This new constraint is less likely to bind the higher the reliability 
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of the H-type good, for a given set of fixed costs. Clearly, though, 
to the extent it is binding, it may modify the shopper/nonshopper 
combinations consistent with competitive equilibria in the search 
versus experience market. 
The capacity and switch price effects associated with adding 
or taking away warranty signals may have an important effect on the 
nature of equilibrium across markets. And, because consumer welfare 
is plainly affected by any tendency for prices to rise above those 
prevailing in competitive markets, the "channel" by which quality 
information is presented to consumers may make a difference, for a 
reasonable subset of combinations of consumer types, whatever the 
consumers' relative willingness to pay for warranty protection. 
As a final point, it is even possible to show that the 
capacity effects explored above can result in a transformation between 
distinct "species" of competitive equilibria; that is, a single-price 
equilibrium in, for example, a search world may evolve into a two-
price equilibrium in the directly corresponding experience good world. 
Such an occurrence, which does not seem pathological, has nevertheless 
quite ambiguous welfare effects. Consider: 
Example. Let the firms operating in the two markets be defined by the 
following parameters: nh = 0.05, nL = 0.25; sL = 20, sH = 16; 
cL = $13.00, cH = $15.00; F = $100.00, F = $10.00. The signaling 
conditions are clearly satisfied, since cHW = $15.79, while 
• cLW = $17.33; the competitive market prices are pL(-w) E $18.00, 
• • • PH(-w} = $21.25, PHW ~ $23.03, PLW = $24.67. Let the set of limit 
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prices defining consumers be: !L(-w) = $33.00, !H<-w> c $36.00, 
lHW = $37.50, and hL(-w) = $47.00, hH(-w) = $50.50, huw = $52.20. It 
is easily verified (referring to the competitive market prices), that 
these consumers exhibit type (1b) preferences. 
Now in the search world, the conditions for a single price 
competitive equilibrium with the L(-w) market only are: 
a1 < 0.24, ~ < 0.14, and a1 + 2~ < 0.77 (this is, of course, the 
subset of the market constraints that are binding). 
Next consider the requirements for a two-price competitive 
equilibrium in a market where warranties distinguish the quality 
levels of goods. Because the L market firms have higher capacities 
than their H-type counterparts, the two-price equilibrium "balancing" 
constraints (equation [3] from Section 3.3) will entail a restriction 
on a; - a;. For the parameters fixed here, 0.24 < a1 - ~ < 0.32 is 
necessary for experience-good two-price equilibrium. If a value less 
than approximately 0.301 is selected for a; - ~· the consumer/firm 
ratio in the experience good market will be less than 16.00. 
Therefore, the necessary balancing condition in the experience good 
market will not translate to the analogous condition in the search 
market. The only competitive equilibrium possible there will be a 
one-price equilibrium. 
It remains only to show that there exists a nontrivial 
partitioning of consumers across types and shopping intensities such 
that the same partitioning is consistent with an L-good only 
competitive equilibrium in the search world and with a two-price 
125 
competitive equilibrium in the "parallel" experience good world. With 
a value of 0.301 chosen 2 2 for at - Bb• a is fixed at 15.95, which in 
turn implies (equations [10]), that~= 0.16 and n~ = 0.84; the 
zero-profit conditions within the experience markets now add the 
restrictions a1 + 0.32~ < 0.89, a1 + 1.68a~ < 1.135, a1 < 0.31, and 
1 2 
~ < 0.18. It is not difficult to check that the choice: at = 0.550, 
~ = 0.249 (implying a1 = 0.201), with~< 0.14, simultaneously 
satisfies all necessary and sufficient conditions in the two worlds. 
Further, the equilibria continue to hold within a (small) neighborhood 
of a~ - ~ = 0.301, and for a considerably larger neighborhood of the 
selected value of a1 , holding a~-~ relatively constant. Therefore, 
the conditions for this type of equilibrium transition, while 
certainly restrictive, are not in general pathological. Note in 
particular that the experience world two-price competitive equilibrium 
associated with an L-type only search good market has, in this case, a 
large majority of H-~ firms! 
3 .S CONCLUSIONS 
This essay has attempted to demonstrate three points. First, 
the ability of consumer warranties to act as informative quality 
signals is not in itself compromised by the presence of imperfect 
search. The empirically observed lack of consistent evidence for a 
signaling function for consumer warranties cannot be explained by an 
appeal to the notion that search is a costly activity for consumers. 
However, the necessity of transmitting quality information via 
lU 
warranties can, depending on the specifics of consumer preferences, 
affect the capacities of markets so as to alter (in some cases 
profoundly) the nature of market equilibrium. The welfare effects of 
costly warranty signals turn on the interaction between their value as 
information and their potential disruption of markets where consumer 
search is imperfect. 
The second and third results of this essay are closely 
related, and contain the common thread of an attempt to draw together 
the equilibrium search literature and the long-standing signaling 
literature, heretofore grounded in an assumption of costless search. 
The second result is that the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
competitive equilibrium in the presence of imperfect search may be 
more readily attained in a market for experience goods with warranties 
acting as proxies for product quality than in a market for search 
goods. Thus, provided that the signaling cost conditions hold (and 
they are relatively innocuous), competitive equilibrium may be more 
readily reinforced by the simple expedient of making consumer 
warranties more readily accessible and understandable to consumers. 
However, if consumers' preferences for the underlying relative 
qualities of goods dominate their desires for comprehensive warranties 
as an added quality feature, the third result states that all 
consumers will tend to strictly prefer the equilibrium resulting in 
the search good world (if it is attainable) over the experience good 
equilibrium. A possible consequence of this might be that as consumers 
become more informed about product quality through venues other than 
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warranty signals (such as a process of reputation validation) the 
pattern of warranty-as-product-signal would tend to erode, as the good 
takes on more search characteristics. 
This essay bas generally treated consumer markets as if the 
goods transacted within them manifest search or experience 
characteristics exclusively. In reality, of course, a given consumer 
durable good (such as an integrated stereo amplifier) may present 
search and experience attributes to consumers simultaneously -- for 
example, consumers can tell by pre-purchase inspection whether the 
tuner section has a multipath elimination circuit, and hence an 
inference can be made about the amplifier's performance in receiving 
remote FM stations. Other aspects of the unit's performance clearly 
remain in the experience category. The welfare comparison carried on 
above between "parallel" search and experience goods markets 
implicitly rests on the existence of alternative information channels 
open to consumers at the time of purchase, which allow them to make 
inferences about quality, and which might substitute for warranties in 
that regard. 
The most important "alternative channel" is the process of 
brand-name identification bolstered by advertising. Through 
advertising, firms make investments in brand-name reputation; the cost 
of misleading or deceptive advertising is the erosion of this capital 
investment. Thus, as Nelson [1974] proposes, the intensity of a 
firm's advertising is a signal of sorts, representing a firm's 
continuing investment in its good name. But it is clear that this is 
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a different kind of signal than a warrantly, more diffuse, and perhaps 
less product-specific. One result of successful advertising is a 
fulfilled expectation about a product's quality in the minds of 
consumers. Such expectations may create external benefits, in the 
form of a favorable reception (initially, at least), for newly-
launched products carrying the firm's name. Such external benefits 
are not conferred by product-specific comprehensive warranties; 
indeed, a more contractual promise of quality may be more expensive to 
the firm than initially reckoned if a new product takes time to attain 
a standard of quality. 
Therefore, this study can give a tentative prediction about 
the kinds of consumer goods markets in which warranties might be 
expected to serve as quality signals, and in which they would not. 
Warranties may perform well as quality indicators in markets where the 
leading attribute of product quality is reliability, and where there 
is some objective, measurable basis for gauging it. Further, 
consumers should place a high premium on enhanced reliability, so much 
so that they are willing to pay premium prices for the extra 
reliability implied by comprehensive warranties. Of course, 
performance on the contractual terms of warranties must be swift and 
frictionless. On the other hand, warranty terms are likely to 
degenerate across firms if i), consumers are unwilling to pay for the 
reliability premium of comprehensive warranties, or if reliability is 
not a leading element of perceived quality; and ii), brand name 
advertising is pervasive, has high credibility with consumers, and is 
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regarded by firms as conferring positive benefits across (as well as 
within) product lines. 
If direct policy prescriptions are not forthcoming from this 
tentative exploration, it should be clear that important connections 
can be and need to be drawn between goods with search and experience 
characteristics. To the extent that most consumer goods have 
attributes of both, leaving either out of the analysis of market 
equilibrium gives an incomplete picture. The theories of consumer 
product warranties associated with search and experience goods are not 
supplanting, but supplementary. 
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FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III 
1. For a review of the current regulatory framework and an important 
critique from the vantage point of equilibrium search theory, see 
Schwartz and Wilde [197 9] • 
2. Two empirical studies are Gerner and Bryant [1981] and Priest 
[1981]. Both studies, however. are subject to similar 
difficulties: adjustment must be made for the fact that 
warranties are typically multidimensional contracts (including, 
for example, separate provisions for parts and labor coverage); 
data is aggregated across brand names for the various goods 
investigated, so that no connection can be made between a level 
of warranty coverage and some measure of a good's intrinsic 
reliability. and so on. 
3. A theory of the consumer warranty based upon a notion of 
comparative advantage is set forth in Priest [1981]. The theory 
holds that the observed pattern of warranty coverage is dictated 
by which party to a sales contract, the consumer or the firm, 
faces the lower cost of insuring against product-related defects 
or failures. Thus firms will warrant against breakdowns of 
refrigerator motors, but not refrigerator door hinges, failures 
of which are more dependent upon the pattern of consumer use than 
on factory quality control 
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4. Unlike the sequential search models, it is not required that 
consumers know the distribution of product types and prices 
before beginning to shop; the weaker assumption made here is that 
consumers are generally aware of the range of product 
reliabilities available, but are unsure as to which products 
correspond to which reliabilities. 
S. As expressed in Schwartz and Wilde [1982b], it is convenient to 
consider warranties as available in two "flavors," limited and 
comprehensive -- the model specified seeks to associate 
comprehensive warranties with quality signals. 
6. See, for example, Gerner and Bryant [1981]. 
7. Wilde and Schwartz [197 9]. 
8. This means of modeling the interaction of competitive search 
markets originated in Schwartz and Wilde [1982a]. 
9. One could, of course, work out all of the cases stemming from the 
feasible permutations of limit and switch prices, but the 
equilibria described would vary only in details from the case 
selected here. 
10. That is. this is a case which (somewhat artifically) reduces to 
132 
the world analyzed in Schwartz and Wilde [1982b]. In this simple 
model of a warranty contract, adding a comprehensive warranty to 
any product creates a homogeneous good with a zero failure 
probability. 
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APPENDIX 
In the example of Section 1.4, the financial signal satisfying the 
neccessary condition for compensation maximization under the incentive 
rule (3) for the manager of a firm 9 = <t1 ,t2> is given by 
which yields: 
c 
F< o, t 2> = -..ll:-
0-[t2 + ~1 • 2 
4c1L 
F(c,c) = 0 
Proof: The standard solution method for first order P.D.E.s with 
linear partial derivative terms will be applied; the same method holds 
for more general Von Naumann-Morgenstern preferences (where the P.D.E. 
may involve terms nonlinear in F.) The P.D.E. and the initial 
condition are written as an equivalent system of ordinary differential 
equations, and then, under the correct conditions, uniqueness of the 
P.D.E. follows from the general uniqueness theorem for ordinary 
differential equations. 
First, the initial path can be written in parametric form. 
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For ~ defined in the interval 0 ! ~ ! 1. The initial condition becomes 
t = 0 1 
_1_ 2 
F(O.t2 > = .£~ + ~] 4c1L 
Now, fix some ~ and move off the initial path onto the integral 
surface in the characteristic direction. Parameterize the 
characteristic curve by a. Provided that the initial path is nowhere 
• characteristic, then the P.D.E. is decomposed into the following 








The solution of the first two O.D.E.s. with the initial conditions in 
~above. is easily seen to be t1 (a.~) =a and t2 (a.~) =a+~. so that 
• the third becomes F'(a.~) = (c0/2c1L )~; adding the initial condition 
and solving gives: 
• The initial path is nowhere characteristic if the Jacobian of the 
transformation from the (~.a) parameterization to the <t1 .t2> coordinates is non-singular. Here. 
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and, converting back to the original variables, 
the boundary condition F(c,c) = 0 sets ~ = 0; simplifying the above 
gives equation (9). 
The fact that the initial curve is continuously differentiable 
and non- characteristic guarantees that the solution (10) holds in 
some neighborhood of the initial path. In this case, the 
characteristic curves are lines of constant slope, and thus, the 
solution holds for an arbitrary bounded set &. D 
